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Scholars who criticize the Supreme Court’s doctrine regarding Native 
American tribal sovereignty have not yet addressed a fundamental 
constitutional concern. The Supreme Court has appropriated the 
recognition power through the judicially created doctrine of implicit 
divestiture, by which the Court presumes that Indian tribes and nations 
have lost all aspects of tribal sovereignty the Court deems “inconsistent” 
with the tribes’ “dependent status.” This practice of “judicial de-
Recognition” violates the separation of powers. Implicit divestiture has 
resulted in a presumption that “All sovereignty is lost except that which is 
specifically retained.” Through implicit divestiture, the Court has gone far 
beyond its normal judicial duties of regulating boundaries among 
sovereigns, constructing appropriate federal common law or implementing 
federal policy. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements regarding the 
recognition power, now is a good time for the Court to re-evaluate its own 
role in tribal recognition. Rather than appropriating the authority to de-
recognize tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule of 
“explicit divestiture.” That is, “All sovereignty is retained except that 
which is specifically and constitutionally surrendered.” Under this 
doctrine, the Court would give greater deference to the political branches 
to determine tribal sovereignty while simultaneously encouraging them to 
adopt clear statements of federal policy regarding the same, relieving the 
judiciary of the burden of sifting through the vast historical record to 
determine ambiguous federal policy and losses or retentions of sovereignty. 
The Court would also avoid violating the separation of powers. 
Such judicial deference to the political branches on the issue of 
recognition would not preclude the Court from fulfilling its judicial role of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Olin-Darling Fellow in Constitutional Law, Stanford Law School; J.D., Pepperdine 
University; Ph.D., University of Nevada Las Vegas. Special thanks to David Tanenhaus, 
Greg Ablavsky, Lawrence Friedman, Raquel Casas, William Bauer, Michael McConnell, 
Will Baude, Michalyn Steele, Jason Iuliano, Mark Storslee, and Geoffrey Sigalet. I am also 
grateful to the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University for giving me the 
opportunity to present a (very) early version of this paper at a faculty workshop and to the 
fine editorial team at American Indian Law Review. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
70 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
considering the constitutional limits of congressional, executive, or state 
power to infringe upon traditional aspects of tribal sovereignty, and it 
would not preclude the Court from considering the possible constitutional 
status of tribes. The Court could still employ a “judicial shield” to protect 
tribal sovereignty from unconstitutional encroachments by the national or 
state governments, but it would lay down its “judicial sword” to intrude 
upon sovereignty itself. 
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I. Introduction 
Native American tribal sovereignty is a constitutional puzzle constantly 
worked upon, but never quite solved. Many of the questions that faced the 
framers and early interpreters of the Constitution continue to perplex 
modern judges, policy makers, and scholars.
1
 Indeed, the Court in its 2015 
term dealt with the question of tribal sovereignty in three cases
2
 and at least 
once in its  2016 and 2017 terms.
3
 Given the sharp division of the Court and 
the many “grey areas” of tribal jurisdiction,
4
 it is likely that issues of Native 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Professor Frank Pommersheim, in anticipation of the Court’s ruling in United States 
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), suggested that the “heart” of the issue was, “[W]hat exactly 
should be the position of tribal sovereignty in a constitutional republic as we head into the 
twenty-first century?” Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in Indian Law? 28 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 305 (2003-2004). 
 2. In Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 
2159 (2016), the Court split 4-4 and thus affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, which 
held in favor of tribal jurisdiction over a civil tort claim filed by a member against a non-
member corporation for a tort alleged to have taken place on reservation land. In United 
States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016), a unanimous Court affirmed that uncounseled tribal 
convictions may be used as predicate offenses in a federal criminal sentencing, even if 
analogous predicates in state courts could not be used due to Sixth Amendment violations. 
Finally, in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016), tribal sovereignty was not 
directly at issue, but the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions all engaged the 
question of tribal sovereignty, revealing continued disagreement, with Justice Thomas 
renewing his call for judicial re-examination and overhaul of the entirety of federal Indian 
law jurisprudence. Id. at 1877. Two other cases from the 2015 term involving tribes, 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016), and Nebraska 
v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016), did not directly touch upon sovereignty issues, but might 
be useful in tribal sovereign recognition cases. 
 3. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (finding tribal sovereign immunity was 
not implicated in an action against a tribal employee for a tort committed in his individual 
capacity); see also United States v. Washington, No. 17-269 (U.S. argued Apr. 18, 2018). 
 4. See Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1638 (2016) (discussing five “grey areas” of tribal criminal jurisdiction); see also Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of 
Indian Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77, 79 (2014-2015) (suggesting that the recently 
enacted Indian provisions of the Violence Against Women Act reauthorization are likely to 
spark further litigation). 
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American sovereignty will continue to find their way to the highest tribunal 
for some time to come.
5
 
Some of the perennial issues are: Where do Indian tribes and nations fit, 
if at all, within the United States’ constitutional framework? Do tribes 
retain aboriginal sovereignty and, if so, how much? Does Congress have 
plenary power to legislate on behalf of tribes and, if so, what is the source 
of this power? Can we ask these questions without first addressing 
threshold questions—can tribes, who did not consent to the Constitution, be 
neatly placed within it, and should they? To what extent may United States 
constitutional values, such as those found within the Establishment and 
Equal Protection Clauses, be imposed on tribes? And, perhaps most 
importantly, who gets to decide all these issues? 
This Article argues that the judiciary has often waded into difficult and 
contentious issues related to tribal sovereignty—such as tribal criminal and 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
6
—without first explicitly engaging with 
fundamental separation of powers questions: What is the role of the 
recognition power with respect to tribes, and what constitutes tribal 
recognition, de-recognition and non-recognition? A lack of attention to the 
recognition power has led to questionable judicial practices—specifically, 
the creation of a de facto judicial de-recognition power as well as the 
misreading of congressional and executive actions, such as the 
discontinuance of treaty making with tribes.
7
 
                                                                                                                 
 5. The even split in Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159, masks further divisions that were 
on display in earlier cases such as Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (three concurrences and one dissent) 
and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (two concurrences and two 
dissents). 
 6. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that 
tribes lacked jurisdiction to try non-members in tribal courts for crimes occurring on Indian 
land); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting a tribe’s civil 
authority over non-Indians within reservations). Most scholars trace the modern articulation 
of the implicit divestiture doctrine to Oliphant. See, e.g., Skibine, supra note 4, at 85-87. 
Montana extended the Court’s implicit divestiture framework to apply in the civil arena as 
well. 
 7. Justice Thomas has indicated, as part of his repeated calls for an overhaul of the 
jurisprudence of Native American sovereignty, that he would “ascribe much more 
significance to legislation such as the Act” that terminated treaty making with the tribes. 
Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 
566). In County of Yakima v. Confederate Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 
U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992), the Court cited the same Act as part of federal efforts to subject 
tribes to substantial federal and state criminal and civil regulatory regimes, stating that 
notions of Indian sovereignty have, “over time, lost their independent sway.”  
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Closer attention to the recognition power—the power to recognize or not 
recognize sovereign states and ruling governments—suggests a more 
limited role for the judiciary. The judicially created doctrine of “implicit 
divestiture” has served as a mask for the unconstitutional practice of 
judicial de-recognition. Implicit divestiture is the doctrine that Indian tribes 
and nations lose sovereign powers not only by express treaty provisions or 
through statute, but also by implication where the attempted exercise of 
sovereignty is “inconsistent” with their “dependent status.”
8
 This third 
category has been the source of judicial mischief. According to the Court, 
the question of whether a sovereign power is “inconsistent” with a tribe’s 
status may be decided by the Court itself in the absence of a statement from 
the political branches. While the Court often grapples with the source of 
congressional or executive authority to exercise governmental power, the 
Court has never asked, let alone answered, the question of where it, as a 
judicial institution, derives the authority to de-recognize the sovereign 
powers of tribes. The recognition power, which includes the powers of de-
recognition and non-recognition, is an executive, not a judicial, power. In 
short, the Court has misappropriated a constitutional power belonging to the 
political branches in federal Indian law. 
For example, the Court has held through judicial de-recognition/implicit 
divestiture that tribes: do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians;
9
 
do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians;
10
 do not have 
regulatory authority over non-members on fee lands within a reservation 
(absent very narrowly-drawn exceptions);
11
 do not have jurisdiction over a 
members’ tort and civil rights claims against state officers for acts alleged 
to have occurred on tribal lands;
12
 do not have civil jurisdiction over a tort 
claim between two non-members occurring on a state highway running 
across reservation land;
13
 do not have the power to tax non-members on 
non-Indian land within a reservation;
14
 and do not have jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                 
 8. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes still possess 
those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a 
necessary result of their dependent status.”); see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (“Indian 
tribes are prohibited from exercising . . . those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’”). 
 9. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. 
 10. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (overturned by congressional statute); see 
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077b, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93), recognized by 
Lara, 541 U.S. at 193-94). 
 11. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. 
 12. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001). 
 13. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). 
 14. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001). 
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review the sale of non-Indian land within a reservation.
15
 In all of these 
cases, the Court used an implicit divestiture framework to find that the 
tribes had been divested of various sovereign powers which autonomous 
states normally exercise, on the basis that such powers were inconsistent 
with the tribes’ “status” and were not essential to the health, safety and 
welfare of the tribes.
16
 And in all of these cases, Congress and the executive 
branch were silent on the specific issue before the Court, except for 
scattered and contradictory statements made anytime between the founding 
and the present. In the absence of a clear statement from the political 
branches affirming or de-recognizing these aspects of tribal sovereignty, the 
Court proceeded to de-recognize them though judicial fiat. The Court 
engaged in judicial conquest. The Court’s holdings under its implicit 
divestiture doctrine go much further than merely regulating boundaries 
between sovereigns; they de-recognize sovereign authority altogether—a 




Implicit divestiture has critics already. Matthew L.M. Fletcher uses 
several pages of his hornbook, Federal Indian Law, to critique the “shabby” 
historical work of the Court in Oliphant, the genesis of the modern implicit 
divestiture doctrine.
18
 In addition, Bethany Berger asserts that the line of 
implicit divestiture cases rest upon two faulty assumptions: that tribal courts 
treat non-Indians unfairly and that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is 
not crucial to tribal self-government.
19
 Two other critics, Michalyn Steele 
and Addie Rolnick, raise functional and practical concerns with implicit 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
332(2008). 
 16. Andrew Fletcher calls Oliphant, Montana and Nevada v. Hicks the “colonial 
trilogy,” drawing a comparison with the Marshall Trilogy, discussed herein. According to 
Fletcher, the “colonial trilogy” continues the work of nineteenth century conquest. Andrew 
K. Fletcher, Suffocating Sovereignty: Implicit Divestiture and the Violation of First 
Principles, 5 DARTMOUTH L.J. 31, 48 (2007). 
 17. This Article argues that the judiciary is not empowered under our constitutional 
system to de-recognize Native American tribes or aspects of their sovereignty. One might 
wonder whether the judiciary may recognize tribes in instances where the political branches 
have not done so through the BIA’s Federal Recognition process. Although the judiciary 
may not appropriate the recognition power to recognize a newly formed tribe, it may 
“recognize,” or take judicial notice of, a tribe that has always existed and whose status as 
such in the eyes of the United States has never been altered. In such a case, the judiciary 
would only maintain the status quo, which is not an act of recognition. 
 18. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 345-58 (2016). 
 19. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in 
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005). 
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divestiture and propose alternative approaches discussed herein.
20
 Others 
attack implicit divestiture from additional angles.
21
 
These criticisms are important, but remain largely in the realm of policy 
or practicality. I write separately to raise an important and fundamental 
constitutional concern yet to be discussed. The Court, by making judicial 
determinations that various tribal actions are “inconsistent with their status” 
has appropriated for itself a constitutional power that is vested in the 
political branches, not the Article III judiciary. Implicit divestiture is more 
than just a bad idea: it violates the separation of powers. The Constitution 
contemplates the political branches’ better institutional competency in 
foreign relations and addresses it through the vesting of the Recognition 
Power. Even absent this constitutional issue, the Court is not well-situated 
to ascertain historical losses of sovereignty. The Court’s black-and-white, 
all-or-nothing legal approach to sovereignty lacks the more adaptive and 
creative approaches that the political branches often employ when dealing 
with sovereign entities, both foreign and domestic. 
Rather than exercising an unconstitutional and unwieldy judicial 
recognition power through implicit divestiture, the Court should adopt a 
rule of explicit divestiture. Under this doctrine, the Court would continue to 
“recognize” divestiture of sovereignty through treaty, reviewing those 
agreements in accordance with well-established principles for the 
interpretation of treaties between the United States and Native peoples.
22
 
The Court would also analyze divestiture of sovereignty by statute to ensure 
that such statutes comport with the constitutional limitations on Congress 
and the executive branch.
23
 The Court should abandon the implicit 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian 
Affairs, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 666 (2016); see also Rolnick, supra note 4. Given the 
similarities of the approaches suggested in this Article to those proposed by Steele and 
Rolnick, I highlight some key differences between them in Part III. 
 21. Robert Clinton helpfully created a long, but non-exhaustive list of articles critical of 
implicit divestiture up to 2002. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause 
for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 207-08 n.282 (2002). For criticism since 2002, see, 
for example, Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of 
Tribal Sovereignty, 55. S.D. L. REV. 48 (2010); Samuel Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the 
Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623 (2011). 
 22. Longstanding rules of Indian treaty construction state that courts are to construe 
treaties in “the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians” and not to 
their prejudice. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979) (internal quotation omitted); see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 
U.S. 194, 199 (1975). 
 23. Adjusting tribal sovereignty through statute, rather than treaty, raises its own set of 
constitutional concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper. For an argument that the 
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divestiture framework—the third prong of divestiture—set forth in its 
Oliphant and Montana cases and adopt a position that all sovereignty is 
retained, except that which has been explicitly and constitutionally 
divested.
24
 In cases where statutes and executive policies regarding the 
exercise of a particular sovereign power by the tribes is ambiguous, the 
Court should presume continued aboriginal sovereignty, consistent with the 
tribes’ ancient status. The Court should do no more than maintain the status 
quo, leaving space for the political branches to act. The Court could, 
however, police the established jurisdictional boundaries among the tribes, 
states, and federal government, reserving for itself a judicial role to 
investigate the sources of congressional and state sovereign powers when 
they abut tribal ones. This approach not only frees the Court from 
ascertaining divestiture by implication (which by its nature is difficult to 
determine), but it also provides a better framework for addressing the 
sovereignty of a large and diverse number of tribes.  
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I gives an overview of both 
the recognition power and implicit divestiture, and explains how implicit 
divestiture misappropriates the political branches’ power. Potential defenses 
of implicit divestiture and why they fail to rescue this unconstitutional 
doctrine are examined in Part II.  Finally, Part III discusses why an explicit 
divestiture doctrine is a better approach to tribal sovereignty, and how it 
would apply in cases past and present, comparing and contrasting it with 
other proposals. This analysis includes a discussion of how the Supreme 
Court may preserve a role for itself to engage in appropriate constitutional 
analysis regarding tribal sovereignty, thereby maintaining a process by 
which tribal sovereignty may be protected by a judicial shield from 
intrusion by the national or state governments, even as the Court lays down 
its judicial sword. 
This Article is consistent with the goal articulated by Alex Tallchief 
Skibine to “constitutionalize” tribal sovereignty
25
 by (1) demonstrating that 
                                                                                                                 
United States should interact through tribes exclusively by treaty, see VINE DELORIA JR. & 
DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 161 (1999). 
 24. This approach would be consistent with that proposed by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, in his Oliphant dissent, who suggests that tribes retain “necessary aspect[s]” of 
their sovereignty that are not withdrawn by treaty or statute. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 25. Skibine, supra note 4, at 81 (“[T]he time has come to integrate federal Indian law 
into constitutional law. From being ‘exceptional,’ federal common law relating to the status 
of Indian tribes as sovereign government has just become ‘exceptionally’ bad. . . . There is 
no need to place federal Indian law in ‘de-constitutionalized zones,’ or ‘walling of Federal 
Indian law from mainstream constitutional discourse.’”). 
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the Court has misappropriated the recognition power; and (2) demonstrating 
that the Constitution is capable of resolving the puzzling questions of tribal 
sovereignty, both in its own acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty as well 
as its vesting of the recognition power. The Constitution vests the 
executive, in the least, or the political branches together, at most, with the 
power to recognize and de-recognize tribal sovereignty.
26
 
II. Implicit Divestiture and the Misappropriation of the Recognition Power 
A. The Recognition Power – An Overview 
Recognition is the “formal acknowledgement that a particular entity 
possesses the qualifications of statehood or that a particular regime is the 
effective government of a state.”
27
 Despite the fact that the power to 
recognize sovereign entities and their governments is a fundamental 
function of the federal government, the words “recognize,” “recognition,” 
and their cognates do not appear in the Constitution.
28
 Robert Reinstein 
suggests that while the Framers were anxious for foreign recognition of 
their new Republic, “the idea that the United States would need to 
recognize foreign states and governments was simply not a pressing issue 
or even something that would predictably occur.”
29
 No matter the reason for 
the omission, the recognition power is derived from other explicitly 
mentioned powers related to foreign affairs. 
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution vests executive power in the 
President. Sections 2 and 3 describe the powers and duties of the 
President.
30
 Some executive powers related to foreign affairs, such as the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Whether the Recognition Power in Indian Affairs belongs exclusively to the 
Executive, as the Court says it does in foreign affairs, or is a shared power between Congress 
and the President, is an open question. This author is of the view that it is a shared power. 
One thing it is not—a judicial power. Ennis, supra note 21. 
 27. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case 
Study on the Original Understanding of Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801 (2011) 
(discussing the history of the Recognition Power).  
 28. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (“Despite the importance of the recognition power 
in foreign relations, the Constitution does not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II 
or elsewhere.”)  
 29. Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive? 86 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2013).  
 30. U.S. CONST. art. II. Ascertaining the limits of those powers, and their interplay with 
the legislative branch, is usually governed by Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952). Interestingly, Article II’s vesting 
clause vests the “executive power” in the President, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, while Article I’s 
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treaty-making power and the appointments of ambassadors, are subject to 
the advice and consent of the Senate.
31
 Others, like the reception of foreign 
ambassadors, may be exercised without Senate approval.
32
 Recognition is 
not only a fundamental aspect of foreign diplomacy, but has domestic legal 
consequences. Recognized sovereigns “may sue in United States courts and 
may benefit from sovereign immunity when they are sued.”
33
 The Supreme 
Court’s most recent investigation of the recognition power yielded an 
opinion holding that the power is exclusive to the executive, whose 
determinations may not be overruled by Congress.
34
 
There is no constitutionally prescribed method for exercising the 
recognition power. Recognition is often explicit by formal declaration,
35
 but 
may also be implied.
36
 For example, when President George Washington 
received Citizen Genet as the ambassador of France, he impliedly 
recognized the legitimacy of the new French revolutionary government.
37
 
More recently, although the United States did not formally recognize the 
sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 
1979, it nevertheless impliedly recognized its de facto authority over 
mainland China by conducting high level ambassadorial talks, including 
President Nixon’s visit to mainland China and his meetings with Mao 
Zedong in 1972. President Carter issued a formal declaration of recognition 
of the PRC in 1979.
38
 
Encompassed within the recognition power is the power to decline to 
recognize a state or government (non-recognition) and the power to 
withdraw recognition from a previously existing state or government 
                                                                                                                 
vesting clause vests only those legislative powers “herein granted,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
For possible implications of this difference, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 33. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (citation omitted). 
 34. Id. at 2076.  
 35. See, e.g., Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, U.S. Recognition of the 
Provisional Government of the State of Israel (May 14, 1948), https://www.archives.gov/ 
files/education/lessons/us-israel/images/recognition-press-release-l.jpg. 
 36. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (“[Recognition] may also be implied—for example, 
by concluding a bilateral treaty or by sending or receiving diplomatic [guests].”). 
 37. See Reinstein, supra note 27, at 840; see also Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091-92. 
 38. President Jimmy Carter, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China: United States Statement (Dec. 15, 1978), AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30309&st=China&st1=. 
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deemed no longer existing or otherwise not legitimate (de-recognition).
39
 
The United States, through the executive, has invoked non-recognition in a 
variety of foreign affairs contexts. President Woodrow Wilson chose not to 
recognize Victoriano Huerta and his administration as the ruling authority 
of Mexico in 1913, despite the earlier activities of the United States’ 
ambassador to bring Huerta into power.
40
 Presidents Wilson, Harding, 
Coolidge, and Hoover did not recognize the Bolshevik government as the 
ruling authority in Russia, nor did they recognize the USSR as a sovereign 
entity.
41
 And President Hoover chose not to recognize Manchukuo in 
1931.
42
 The exercise of the de-recognition power usually follows internal 
regime change or war. For example, thirty years following the Chinese 
Civil War, President Carter de-recognized the Republic of China (ROC) as 
the sovereign government of China.
43
 
As with the exercise of the recognition power, there is no constitutionally 
prescribed method for exercising the non-recognition or de-recognition 
power. President Carter, for example, unilaterally nullified the Sino-
American Mutual Defense Treaty, by which the United States had pledged 
support to the ROC in the defense of Taiwan if it was invaded.
44
 The 
nullification was, according to Carter, a necessary step to formal 
recognition of the PRC’s sovereignty over China, and effectively de-
recognized any claim to sovereignty over mainland China by the ROC.
45
 As 
with recognition, de-recognition may be accomplished explicitly or through 
implication. 
Importantly, the United States has often adopted a nuanced, even 
ambiguous, approach to the sovereign status of various foreign entities for a 
variety of reasons, prominent among them a desire to avoid the 
precipitation of hostilities.
46
 Even as President Carter de-recognized the 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091-92 (citing 2 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 1 (1963)). 
 40. Peter V. N. Henderson, Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta and the Recognition 
Issue in Mexico, 41 THE AMERICAS 151 (1984). 
 41. J.H. Wilson, American Business and the Recognition of the Soviet Union, 52 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 349, 368 (1971). 
 42. Richard N. Current, The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine, 59 AM. HIST. 
REV. 513, 542 (1954). 
 43. See Jonathan M. Kayes, The Republic of China and Derecognition, 34 J. INT’L AFF. 
191, 194 (1980). 
 44. Id. at 191.  
 45. Id. at 194.  
 46. See Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 505 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (characterizing the 
United States’ relationship with Taiwan as one of “strategic ambiguity”). 
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ROC’s authority over mainland China, Congress passed the Taiwan 
Relations Act, and the United States continues to maintain quasi-diplomatic 
relations with the ROC in Taiwan.
47
 It has been the policy of several 
administrations to avoid adopting an “all-or-nothing” approach to the 
sovereignty of Taiwan. The United States studiously avoids asserting PRC 
or ROC control of the island, only “acknowledging” the PRC’s position that 
it has complete sovereignty there.
48
 Similarly, the United States walks a 
diplomatic tightrope with Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem,
49
 as well as a 
host of other “hotspots” around the globe.  
Because of the complex nature of foreign affairs, and because foreign 
relations necessarily reflect foreign policy, the political branches are much 
better suited than the judiciary to make determinations about recognition, 
non-recognition, and de-recognition. Indeed, whenever the issue of the 
appropriateness of foreign sovereign recognition has come before the 
United States Supreme Court, the Court has shown extreme deference to the 
political branches, particularly the executive. In Goldwater v. Carter,
50
 
when Senator Barry Goldwater and several other senators alleged that 
President Carter lacked authority to nullify the Sino-American Defense 
Treaty without Senate approval, the Court refused to review President 
Carter’s action, and directed the Complaint be dismissed.
51
 Although they 
disagreed on the reasons for the dismissal, none of the justices indicated 
that the Court itself should have any say in determining the sovereign status 
of Taiwan; they only disagreed on the question of whether the Court could 
decide who, between the political branches, makes the substantive 
decision.
52
 More recently, the Court found a recognition question to be 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: 
The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 765, 779-80 (2007) 
(“U.S. courts have consistently held that on the basis of the TRA, the ROC-US Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation continues to be effective. They observed that the 
United States maintains ‘de facto’ recognition of Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations are 
‘quasi-governmental relations.’”).  
 48. See Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the 
United States of America and the People’s Republic of China: January 1, 1979 (Dec. 15, 
1978), https://photos.state.gov/libraries/ait-taiwan/171414/ait-pages/prc_e.pdf. 
 49. The subject of the Court’s most recent pronouncement of the Recognition Power 
involved assertions of sovereignty over Jerusalem. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 50. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 51. Id. at 997. 
 52. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases firmly establish that the 
Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and to withdraw 
recognition from, foreign regimes.”). 
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justiciable and resolved a constitutional dispute between the political 
branches in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry.
53
 Given the Court’s 
extensive investigation of the recognition power in Zivotofsky, a closer 
examination of that case is informative for thinking about recognition in the 
context of Native American sovereignty. 
Longstanding federal executive policy has been to decline to recognize 
any entity as having sovereignty over Jerusalem.
54
 The State Department, in 
issuing passports to United States citizens born in Jerusalem, refuses to list 
“Jerusalem, Israel” as the place of birth on passports.
55
 Rather, it lists the 
place of birth simply as “Jerusalem.”
56
 Congress, however, passed the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act in 2002, which includes a provision 
requiring the Secretary of State to list Israel as the place of birth for United 
States citizens born in Jerusalem who make such a request.
57
 President 
George W. Bush, when signing the bill into law, issued a signing statement 
to indicate that he interpreted the provision as “advisory,” not as a 
mandate.
58
 He declined Congress’s “advice,” as did his successor in office, 
President Obama.
59
 When petitioners in Zivotofsky sought issuance of a 
passport listing “Jerusalem, Israel” as the place of birth for their newborn 
and the State Department declined, the constitutionality of the statute was 
placed before the Supreme Court.
60
 
The Court held that the executive holds the exclusive power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns and that the provision of the statute at issue was an 
unconstitutional intrusion into the executive’s prerogative.
61
 The Court’s 
reasoning was based in a textual, structural, and functional reading of the 
Constitution.
62
 The Court found that although the recognition power was 
not vested explicitly as such, and although some presidential prerogatives in 
foreign affairs were subject to Senate approval, foreign affairs generally 
were vested with the executive.
63
 Further, the Court stated that it was 
                                                                                                                 
 53. 135 S. Ct. 2076. 
 54. Id. at 2081.  
 55. Id. at 2082.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. President George W. Bush, Statement on the Signing of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2002), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63928. 
 59. Presidential Determination No. 2017-3, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,973 (Dec. 1, 2016).  
 60. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 61. Id. at 2096. 
 62. See id. at 2086.  
 63. See id. at 2085-87. 
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Given the uniqueness of Native American tribes in the United States 
constitutional system, the Court in Zivotofsky declined to review and apply 
cases involving tribal sovereignty as precedent.
65
 Nevertheless, the opinion 
is instructive for its acknowledgment of the limited role of the judiciary in 
“delicate,” “difficult,” and “complex” affairs of recognition.
66
 “In our 
constitutional system these matters are committed to the Legislature and the 
Executive, not the Judiciary.”
67
 In Zivotofsky, no one asked for the Court’s 
opinion on the sovereign status of Jerusalem, but only for a ruling on who 
gets to make the decision.
68
 It would have been unconstitutional, according 
to the Court’s own framing of the issue, if the Court had attempted to 
determine the issue itself by holding that Jerusalem is or is not part of 
Israel. Similarly, in earlier cases, no one asked for the Court’s opinion on 
the appropriate diplomatic relationship the United States should have with 
Taiwan, or Palestine, or Israel, or Cuba, or any other country. It would be 
presumptuous and unconstitutional for the Court to hold forth on such 
matters. It is plausible to suggest that the Court might precipitate an 
international crisis if it were to hold, for example, that Taiwan, or Israel, or 
Ukraine have been divested of various aspects of sovereignty. And yet, in 
the context of tribal recognition, the Court has done just that, under the 
guise of implicit divestiture. 
B. Implicit Divestiture – An Overview 
In 1978, the Court laid the foundation for the modern jurisprudence of 
tribal sovereignty in three opinions decided within a span of two months. 
The Court first articulated what came to be known as the implicit 
divestiture doctrine in 1978 in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe.
69
 In Oliphant, 
the Court confronted the issue of whether the Suquamish Tribe had 
jurisdiction to arrest and try a non-Indian accused of committing a crime on 
tribal land.
70
 Mark David Oliphant, a non-Indian living on the Port Madison 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 2086 (quoting American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 369, 424 (2003)). 
 65. Id. at 2090-91 (“Other cases describing a shared power address the recognition of 
Indian tribes—which is, similarly, a distinct issue from the recognition of foreign 
countries.”). 
 66. Id. at 2081. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 2083.  
 69. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 70. Id. at 194-95.  
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Indian Reservation in Washington, had been charged in tribal court with 
assault and resisting arrest.
71
 Oliphant, through the habeas procedures of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
72
 challenged the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction by the Tribe over him by virtue of his not being an Indian.
73
 




In holding that the Tribe lacked jurisdiction over Oliphant, the Court 
reviewed the lengthy history of the Suquamish with the United States, 
searching in vain for an explicit treaty or congressional statute by which the 
Suquamish relinquished criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
75
 After 
finding some treaty provisions that were tangentially related to the matter, 
the Court stated, “By themselves, these treaty provisions would probably 
not be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if the 
Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction.”
76
 The Court could have 
concluded its opinion there and held that the Tribe retained such 
jurisdiction. However, the Court continued and found that  
[E]ven ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy, 
Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent 
affirmative delegation of such power by Congress. . . . Indian 
tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of 
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and 
those powers “inconsistent with their status.”
77
 
This question—whether the Tribe was attempting to exercise a power 
“inconsistent with [its] status”—was a new kind of judicial inquiry, one not 
contemplated by previous courts. This framework for ruling on the 
existence of tribal sovereign powers raised more issues than it resolved. 
First, what does it mean to exercise a power “inconsistent with their 
status?” Second, and more importantly, who gets to make that decision? 
And third, does the loss of sovereign power by historical implication rise to 
constitutional status? That is, once lost, is it gone forever, or can it be 
restored? The Court answered the first two questions in Oliphant (and its 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 194.  
 72. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012)). 
 73. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.  
 74. Id. at 194-95.  
 75. Id. at 196-212.  
 76. Id. at 208. 
 77. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 
1976)). 
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progeny) and addressed the third question in United States v. Lara, 
discussed herein. 
In Oliphant, the Court analyzed whether the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians was consistent with the Tribe’s “status,” 
finding that it was not.
78
 The Court justified its finding by reference to 
various clippings from American history, including the Non-Intercourse 
Act of 1790, an opinion of the United State Attorney General from 1834, 
and the opinion of a federal judge from 1878.
79
 The Court did not find 
express statements from the political branches on the issue.
80
 Indeed, the 
Court framed the issue in such a way that it was unlikely to rule in the 
Tribe’s favor.
81
 In the beginning of the discussion, the Court stated, 
“Respondents do not contend that their exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians stems from affirmative congressional authorization or 
treaty provision.”
82
 And why should they have so contended? Prior 
decisions had acknowledged the domestic nation status of tribes.
83
 
Although the Court concluded the opinion by inviting Congress to address 
the issue, the Court took upon itself the role of adjudicating whether aspects 
of sovereignty were consistent with tribes’ status without first addressing 




The troubling potential consequences of the Oliphant decision may have 
been obscured partly by two other cases from 1978, both of which affirmed 
aspects of tribal sovereignty. The second foundational decision in 1978 was 
United States v. Wheeler.
85
 There, the Court was asked to determine 
whether the dual sovereignty doctrine was applicable in a case involving 
tribal courts.
86
 The dual sovereignty doctrine posits that the constitutional 
prohibition on being tried twice for the same crime (double jeopardy) is not 
implicated when a defendant is prosecuted by separate sovereigns, even for 
the same underlying conduct.
87
 Thus, a defendant who is tried by a state for 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 199-201 (citing Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; 2 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 693 (1834); Ex parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878)). 
 80. Id. at 204.  
 81. See id.  
 82. Id. at 195. 
 83. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831). 
 84. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.  
 85. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 86. Id. at 314.  
 87. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also Abbate v. United 
States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1959). 
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criminal conduct cannot invoke the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth 
Amendment when he is tried by the United States for the same conduct. 
The underlying theory is that he has committed two offenses, one against 
the individual state and one against the United States.
88
 The question in 
Wheeler was whether an individual who had been tried in a tribal court 
could invoke double jeopardy to avoid prosecution by the United States for 
the same underlying conduct, or whether the dual sovereignty doctrine 
would nullify double jeopardy.
89
 The Court held the dual sovereignty 
doctrine did apply. That is, the involved tribe in this case, the Navajo 
Nation, had not surrendered its sovereign power to try and punish tribal 
members for violating tribal law.
90
 In doing so, the Navajo Nation acted as 
an independent sovereign, and not an extension of the federal government. 
Thus, the defendant was precluded from taking advantage of the double 
jeopardy clause. The Court in Wheeler succinctly formulated the new 
implicit divestiture doctrine: “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of 
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a 
necessary result of their dependent status.”
91
 The Court engaged in a brief 
implicit divestiture analysis, finding that the “powers of self-government, 
including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, . . . 




Similarly, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
93
 decided a few weeks 
later, the Court again refused to disturb tribal sovereignty. At issue was 
whether the ICRA, which applied many provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
tribal governance, created a civil cause of action against a tribe for an 
alleged violation of equal protection in its method of regulating 
membership.
94
 The Tribe’s membership rules were clearly based on gender, 
creating different outcomes for female and male members of the Tribe. Yet 
the Court ruled in favor of the Tribe, refusing to find an implied civil cause 
of action within the ICRA, which, the majority held, only created a federal 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131-32 (“Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a 
State or territory. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot 
be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the 
same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he 
is justly punishable.”) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852)). 
 89. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 314. 
 90. Id. at 321-22.  
 91. Id. at 323. 
 92. Id. at 326. 
 93. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 94. Id. at 63-64.  
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habeas corpus procedure for criminal cases.
95
 The case was decided as a 
matter of textual interpretation; the Court did not engage with the third 
prong of Oliphant. Rather, the Court uncharacteristically decided to “tread 
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”
96
 
Essentially, the Court ignored implicit divestiture. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, who authored the opinion, had dissented in Oliphant where he 
argued against the adoption of implicit divestiture.
97
 
Read together, Oliphant and Wheeler create an analytical framework in 
which tribes retain an inherent aboriginal sovereignty, derived from a 
source distinct from that of the United States and the several states. Such 
sovereignty can be divested through treaty, statute, or by implication.
98
 
Additionally, Santa Clara Pueblo indicated the Court would not second-
guess tribal rules regarding membership, even where membership rules 
might raise constitutional concerns in other governmental contexts.
99
 And 
although Oliphant created a new judicial power, Wheeler and Santa Clara 
Pueblo suggested the court would “tread lightly” in exercising it.  
However, the third prong of Oliphant—divestiture through implication—
has been the cause of judicial mischief. For if we value clear, determinate, 
and predictable rules, the Court in its application of implicit divestiture, has 
been vague, indeterminate and, at times, schizophrenic.
100 
To the extent the 
Court has been predictable, it has been suspicious of retained sovereignty. 
Further, as argued herein, implicit divestiture is a mask for the exercise of 
judicial de-recognition and a violation of the separation of powers. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 60-62.  
 96. Id. at 60. 
 97. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  
 98. The Court in Wheeler states that tribal sovereignty is subject to complete defeasance 
by Congress, through the exercise of its plenary power. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 323 (1978). The tension created by simultaneous assertions of inherent aboriginal 
sovereignty and congressional plenary power is the subject of Justice Thomas’s repeated 
calls for a reexamination of “the premises and logic of [the Court’s] tribal sovereignty 
cases.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]uch of 
the confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two largely incompatible and doubtful 
assumptions. First, Congress . . . can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without 
rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. Second, the Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty to 
enforce their criminal laws against their own members.”) (citation omitted). 
 99. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54-56 (1978). 
 100. “Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion 
continues to infuse federal Indian law and our cases.” Lara, 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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The Court expounded and continued to build the implicit divestiture 
doctrine in Montana v. United States.
101
 There, the Court was asked to 
determine whether the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing on 
tracts of land located within the reservation but owned in fee simple by 
non-members of the Tribe.
102
 In finding that the Tribe could not, the Court 
further articulated the implicit divestiture doctrine by expounding upon 
what it means to say a tribe’s exercise of sovereign power is “inconsistent 
with its status.”
103
 The Court created a presumption that tribes could not 
exercise sovereign regulatory powers over non-Indians unless they could 
point to at least one of two exceptions. First, a tribe may regulate the 
activities of non-Indians through taxation and licensing where the non-
Indian has entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe such as 
“commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements.”
104
 Second, 
the tribe may exercise civil authority over non-Indians on fee lands when 
their conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
105
 In creating 
these two exceptions, which themselves invite a considerable degree of 
discretion in their application, the Court severely curtailed tribes’ civil 
sovereign power over non-Indians. The Court did not explain why non-
criminal conduct by non-Indians that threatens the health or welfare of the 
tribe might be subject to tribal authority, while criminal conduct by non-
Indians that threatens the health or welfare of the tribe is beyond tribal 
jurisdiction. Montana did in the civil sphere what Oliphant did in the 
criminal sphere—create a presumption that tribal sovereignty has been 
divested absent a clear affirmation from the political branches. All is lost 
except that which is specifically retained. 
Oliphant de-recognized a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
to the point of extinction, and Montana and its progeny de-recognized a 
tribe’s civil jurisdiction over non-Indians almost to the point of extinction. 
In neither case did the Court engage with the recognition power and 
consider whether it had constitutional authority to hold tribes divested of 
sovereign powers. The question of the nature of implicit divestiture became 
the subject of constitutional dialogue between the Court and Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 101. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 102. The “checkerboard” nature of land ownership within many reservations is the result 
of the allotment policy and subsequent repurchase policy of the Indian New Deal. See infra 
text accompanying notes 258-62. 
 103. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.  
 104. Id. at 565. 
 105. Id. at 566.  
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beginning with Duro v. Reina
106
 in 1990, Congress’s “Duro-Fix"
107
 in 1990, 
and United States v. Lara
108
 in 2004. Because this dialogue is central to 
discussing a potential (but ultimately faulty) defense of implicit divestiture, 
I address it in depth in Part II. The Court continued with its implicit 
divestiture doctrine in its post-Lara jurisprudence. 
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court held that the tribes lacked 
jurisdiction over a civil tort claim between two non-Indians for a car 
accident occurring on a state highway across reservation land.
109
 And, in 
Nevada v. Hicks, the Court held that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction 
over state officials for allegedly tortious acts committed on Indian land.
110
 
In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court 
applied the implicit divestiture framework, including the narrow Montana 
exceptions, to hold that the sale of fee simple land on a reservation by a 
non-Indian entity to another non-Indian entity was not reviewable by tribal 
courts.
111
 The Court found that the seller of the land, a non-Indian owned 
bank, had not consented to the regulatory authority of the tribe, despite 
extensive contacts. Further, the Court held, the sale of fee-owned land did 
not implicate the political integrity, economic security, or health and safety 
of the tribe.
112
 Thus, neither of the two Montana exceptions to implicit 
divestiture applied, and the tribe lacked sovereign power to review a 
commercial real estate transaction occurring within the reservation.
113
 The 
Court in Plains Commerce Bank specifically reinforced the judicially 
created notions that, in general, the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian 
Tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the Tribe,”
114
 efforts 
by a tribe to regulate non-members are “presumptively invalid,” and the 
burden rests on the tribe to establish one of the limited Montana 
exceptions.
115
 Plains Commerce Bank reinforces the notion that all 
sovereignty is lost except that which is specifically affirmed by Congress, 
                                                                                                                 
 106. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 107. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012). 
 108. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 109. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
 110. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 111. 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
 112. Id. at 336.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 328 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). In making 
this assertion the Court failed to note the congressional “Duro-Fix” in which Congress 
specifically affirmed a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over Indian non-members. 
 115. Id. at 330 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001)).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/2
No. 1] TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY & RECOGNITION POWER 89 
 
 




C. Implicit Divestiture Is a Mask for Judicial De-Recognition 
Whenever the Court issues a ruling that the tribes have been divested of 
sovereign powers under implicit divestiture, it adjusts the sovereign powers 
of the tribes without constitutional authorization or delegated authority 
from the political branches. In the absence of treaty statements or clear 
federal policy regarding the exercise of any particular sovereign power, the 
Court generally presumes such powers are lost. The Court’s holdings under 
implicit divestiture are acts of judicial de-recognition. The reason that the 
Court’s rulings upholding tribal sovereignty in the absence of treaty 
statements or clear federal policy, such as in Wheeler and Santa Clara 
Pueblo, are not acts of judicial recognition is because such holdings do 
nothing more than acknowledge and maintain an ancient status quo—the 
particular aspects of the relationship between the tribes and the United 
States that remain undisturbed, but subject to future adjustment. 
Native American tribes have a unique, sui generis status in their 
relationships with the United States, not identical to foreign nations and not 
identical to states. Indeed, the tri-partite Commerce Clause, by which 
Congress is vested with authority to regulate commerce among the states, 
with foreign entities and with Indian tribes suggests this difference in 
status.
117
 Various court decisions have described Native American tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations,”
118





 and “unique aggregations possessing attributes of 
sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”
121
 The political 
branches themselves, as will be discussed more fully herein, have adopted 
similar appellations for Indian tribes. The relationship between the United 
States and its tribal nations is complex, difficult, and sensitive, just as its 
                                                                                                                 
 116. The majority in Plains Commerce even calls attention to the fact that the exceptions 
are rarely held to apply on non-Indian land—seemingly to suggest how narrow the 
exceptions really are—a self-fulfilling prophecy. “Tellingly, with only ‘one minor exception, 
we have never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over 
nonmembers on non-Indian land.’” Id. at 333 (citation omitted). 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes . . . .”). 
 118. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831).  
 119. Id. 
 120. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978). 
 121. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
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relationships with any number of foreign sovereigns. The Court is ill suited 
to make determinations about losses of tribal sovereignty just as it is ill 
suited to make determinations about the sovereign status of Taiwan or other 
foreign entities. 
The Court’s implicit divestiture canon demonstrates that the Court 
assumes tribal sovereignty has been lost. Plains Commerce Bank is an 
example of the Court interpreting congressional silence as detrimental to 
tribal sovereignty. In discussing the Dawes Act of 1887,
122
 by which tribal 
lands were allotted and sold to individuals, including non-Indians, the Court 
found it implausible that Congress wanted to subject non-Indians to tribal 
jurisdiction even when they purchased land falling within reservations.
123
 
The Court based this determination on what Congress did not say in the 
Act, rather than what it did say. “‘[T]here is simply no suggestion’ in the 
history of the [General Allotment] Act ‘that Congress intended that non-
Indians who would settle upon alienated allotted lands would be subject to 
tribal regulatory authority.’”
124
 This is true, yet the Court offers no 
explanation as to why congressional silence should be interpreted as 
indicating a loss of tribal sovereignty, rather than a retention. 
Plains Commerce Bank illustrates another practice contributing to the 
problem—the use of the royal “we” when discussing recognition. Consider 
the following short declarative sentence at the beginning of the opinion’s 
analysis and all that is implied thereby: “For nearly two centuries now, we 
have recognized Indian tribes as ‘distinct independent political 
communities,’ . . . .”
125
 This sentence may be meant only to set up the rest 
of the opinion, yet it starts the Court out on the wrong foot. What is meant 
by “we” and what is meant by the casual use of the word “recognize?” 
“We,” in this context, does not refer to the United States government as a 
whole and certainly not to the executive. Rather, “we” refers to the Court. 
“We, the Court,” have recognized Indian tribes as political communities.
126
 
In one simple and seemingly uncontroversial sentence, the Court asserts a 
judicial recognition power. What follows? The Court seamlessly moves 
                                                                                                                 
 122. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
 123. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 
(2008).  
 124. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 (1981)). 
 125. Id. at 327 (citation omitted). 
 126. For a critique of judicial supremacy in general, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme 
Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); see also KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).  
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from the assertion of a judicial recognition power to the assertion of a 
judicial de-recognition power under the guise of implicit divestiture. A 
better opening to the Plains Commerce Bank opinion would read something 
like, “Except for the periods of allotment and termination, the United States 
government for nearly two centuries has chosen to recognize Native 
American sovereignty, albeit curtailed.” Such an introduction might cause 
the Court to take a step back from its own involvement in the recognition 
process and merely call “balls and strikes.”
127
 
The careful language of divestiture serves as a mask for judicial de-
recognition in other ways. First, note the persistent use of the passive voice 
when describing divestiture. For example, in Wheeler, the Court said, 
“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by 
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent 
status.”
128
 Although we may reasonably guess who does the “withdrawing” 
when divestiture occurs through treaty (executive) and statute (legislative), 
the Court avoids telling us who does the “withdrawing” when divestiture 
occurs through implication. And even though it may be theoretically 
possible for the political branches to effectuate a change in tribal status 
outside the traditional methods of treaties and legislation, it is historically 
rare. In reality, the entity that “withdraws” aspects of tribal sovereignty 
through implicit divestiture is the Court itself. 
The language of implicit divestiture further masks recognition by 
suggesting that the Court is engaging in a kind of benign and passive 
constitutional analysis. To illustrate what the Court is actually doing, it is 
helpful to make a comparison to foreign affairs. Occasionally, the United 
States will disallow foreign sovereigns to prosecute United States citizens, 
especially military personnel and contractors.
129
 In those cases, it would not 
typically be said that the United States has divested the foreign nation of a 
sovereign power. Rather, it would be more precise to say that the United 
States refuses to recognize a foreign sovereign’s power to prosecute a 
United States citizen. Even if the linguistic distinction is semantical, the 
most important lesson from the comparison is that in foreign affairs, one or 
both of the political branches make the decision to shield United States 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See Roberts: ‘My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat’, 
CNN.COM (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ 
(statement of Chief Justice Roberts during his confirmation hearings). 
 128. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 129. See, e.g., Alan F. Williams, The Case for Overseas Article III Courts: The 
Blackwater Effect and Criminal Accountability in the Age of Privatization, 44 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 45 (2010). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
92 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
citizens from foreign prosecution, not the judiciary. In tribal affairs, it 
would be more linguistically precise to say that the United States refuses to 
recognize a tribe’s authority to prosecute a non-Indian—especially a United 
States citizen—rather than saying a tribe is divested or has lost that power 
through implication. Such precision in language would serve to remind us 
that the decision is not judicial in nature, but is the prerogative of one or 
both of the political branches. 
D. Problems 
There are two main problems with implicit divestiture—one 
constitutional and one judicial. Implicit divestiture implicates the separation 
of powers. Further, the Court has not articulated clear, determinate, and 
predictable rules upon which tribes, law enforcement, lower courts, and the 
populace in general may reliably operate.  
1. Constitutional Problems  
A constitution, at its heart, is a system that allocates decision-making 
power. Under the United States system, the power of interacting with 
sovereign entities is vested in the federal executive, with Senate input for 
particular actions like treaty making and the appointment of ambassadors. 
The constellation of foreign affairs powers includes the authority to 
recognize and de-recognize sovereign entities and is vested in the executive 
to provide unity, clarity, and coherence. In the context of foreign affairs, the 
Court has wisely avoided misappropriating the recognition power from the 
legislative and executive branches. There, the Court has recognized its own 
limited role, saying, “In our constitutional system, these matters are 
committed to the Legislature and the Executive, not the Judiciary. . . . [T]he 
Court does no more, and must do no more, than note the existence of . . . 
debate and tensions . . . .”
130
 
In the context of tribal sovereignty, the Court has adopted a different 
approach, and never explained its reasoning. Implicit divestiture runs 
counter to the constitutionally created process of recognition as well as de-
recognition—a process the Court respects in foreign affairs. In that arena, 
the Court has never come close to assuming a foreign sovereign has lost or 
otherwise been divested of sovereign powers in the absence of clear 
statements from the political branches. And yet, with tribes, the Court has 
de-recognized tribal sovereign powers by holding those ancient and pre-
constitutional powers no longer exist, for some reason, unless the tribes can 
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point to specific re-affirmations from Congress. By holding that tribes are 
implicitly divested of sovereign powers, the Court de-recognizes their 
sovereignty.  
The Constitution does not accidentally vest the recognition power with 
the executive. As even the Court has stated, following the Constitution in 
this matter allows the country to speak with “one voice.”
131
 Implicit 
divestiture has contributed to multiple voices on tribal sovereignty. Not 
only has the Court contradicted the will of the political branches, the Court 
lacks even internal consistency. When the recognition power of the 
executive is respected, federal recognition may change with new 
executives, or even during the administration of a single executive.  The 
nation speaks with one voice. However, by inserting itself into the decision-
making process, the Court has created confusion. It becomes unclear as to 
whether the Court will rule in favor of or against tribal sovereignty 
(although the odds are against), let alone whether such a holding is 
consistent with executive pronouncements. 
The Court’s reasoning in Zivotofsky, as to why the recognition power 
regarding foreign entities, has been constitutionally and historically vested 
in the executive applies with equal force to the question of whether the 
judiciary should be involved in making determinations about the loss of 
sovereignty in the context of Native Americans. In Zivotofsky, the Court 
based its decision not only on textual and historical grounds, but also on a 
functional reading of the Constitution,
132
 finding that for reasons of unity 
and clarity, the recognition power is vested exclusively in the executive. 
“Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one 
voice.’”
133
 Further, the “President is capable in ways Congress is not, of 
engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead 
to a decision on recognition.”
134
 We might add that the judiciary is certainly 
not capable of carrying on delicate diplomatic contacts with foreign nations 
or Indian tribes. The Court readily acknowledges a need for delicacy and 
tact in the area of foreign recognition; the Court should also acknowledge 
the need for delicacy and tact in the area of tribal recognition. The Court 
has, in the past forty years added its voice to that of the political branches in 
tribal recognition matters, muddying the waters. There is an interesting 
question left open by the Court in Zivotofsky regarding whether tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 132. Id. (stating that “functional considerations” suggest that the power is exclusive). 
 133. Id. (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (alteration in 
original) (second internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 134. Id.  
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recognition is, like in foreign affairs, an exclusively executive power or 
whether Congress should be involved. This Article does not seek to answer 
that question. Whether it is an exclusive executive power or shared political 
power, one thing it is not: a judicial power. 
There are two seemingly related, but in reality, quite distinct 
governmental powers regarding Native American tribal sovereignty, one of 
which is appropriate for the judiciary, while the other, being an executive 
(or possibly shared political) power, is not. The Court has not been careful 
to distinguish between these powers, and has thus conflated them and 
asserted itself inappropriately at times into political branch determinations. 
The first governmental power, a judicial one, is to question the 
constitutional source of federal authority to interact with the tribes, as well 
as to investigate the potential status of tribal sovereignty as part of the 
constitutional structure. The second governmental power is the authority to 
recognize sovereigns, including domestic dependent nations. Although the 
recognition power is not operable against states by virtue of their being part 
of the constitutional structure, it nevertheless is a valid important 
diplomatic tool in structuring the United States’ relationship with Native 
American tribes. It is a power appropriately vested in Articles I and II, not 
Article III.  
2. Judicial Problems: A Lack of Clear, Determinate Standards 
A cardinal principal of societies aspiring to be governed by the rule of 
law is that the rules of law are clear, determinate, and predictable. Michalyn 
Steele has called attention to the lack of clear, determinate, and predictable 
rules in the application of implicit divestiture,
135
 and her suggestion to 
replace implicit divestiture through the political question doctrine is 
discussed in Part III. The Supreme Court has created, as only the Supreme 
Court can do, a three-part test for determining tribal sovereign 
divestiture,
136
 followed by the creation of two exceptions to the third prong 
of the three part test,
137
 followed by decisions demonstrating that the two 
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exceptions are to be narrowly construed with the burden resting on the 
tribes to show their applicability.
138
 The exceptions work in theory, but the 
Court rarely allows them to be put into practice. 
Implicit divestiture keeps everyone guessing. The stated standards are 
that tribes are divested of powers “inconsistent with their status” and that 
they retain regulatory powers necessary for tribal self-government, 
economic well-being, and the health and safety of the tribes. And yet, 
Supreme Court case law has provided no guidance as to what those lofty 
phrases mean. The Court paradoxically suggests that non-Indians’ civil 
activities might implicate the health and welfare of a tribe giving rise to 
tribal regulatory authority, but that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians for even murders that go federally unprosecuted. Murders 
certainly implicate the health and welfare of the tribe, as do less serious 
offenses. Indians and non-Indians alike struggle to know how to structure 
their commercial relationships on tribal lands in the absence of predictable 
rules of law. Some lower courts, as Addie Rolnick argues, have already 
begun to implement a version of implicit divestiture that is less hostile to 
tribal sovereignty.
139
 As admirable as those efforts may be, they do not 
remove doubt as to whether such decisions will be overturned on appeal. 
The Court should be asked to confront the constitutionality of implicit 
divestiture. Given that the Court has recently thoroughly examined the 
recognition power (although in a context outside of tribal sovereignty), and 
given that the Court continually faces issues of tribal sovereignty, the Court 
should engage in a thorough examination of the recognition power as it 
pertains to tribal sovereignty. If it is true that judicial confusion follows 
political branch confusion, as Justice Thomas asserts, then the appropriate 
solution is to force the political branches to handle the issue by requiring 
explicit statements of divestiture and assert that the Court will no longer 
attempt to read congressional and executive tea leaves.
140
 The default 
position should be that all that is not specifically surrendered is retained. 
                                                                                                                 
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe.”) (citation omitted). 
 138. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Montana, 450 U.S. 544. 
 139. See Rolnick, supra note 4, at 1646 (“More recently, though, courts have followed 
the lead of tribes, scholars and advocates by employing an inside out approach to determine 
the boundaries of tribal criminal jurisdiction.”). 
 140. This approach would be consistent with a canon of interpretation in federal Indian 
law that “tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s intent to the 
contrary is clear and unambiguous.” See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 
2.02, at 114 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012) [hereinafter COHEN].  
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This approach would call for the reexamination of implicit divestiture cases 
since Oliphant. Of course, in abandoning the implicit divestiture 
framework, the Court should articulate a new (and constitutional) standard 
of review for tribal sovereignty cases. One approach is suggested in Part III. 
Before discussing that approach, though, it is necessary to address the 
potential justifications of implicit divestiture. 
III. Potential Justifications of Implicit Divestiture Are Unavailing 
The Court has not clearly characterized or justified its actions under 
implicit divestiture. Rather, it has proceeded without a thorough 
investigation of not only the recognition power, but of its own judicial 
authority to engage in acts of divestiture. There are three potential 
justifications for the Court’s actions: (1) rulings under implicit divestiture 
are appropriate for the judiciary because they are constitutional in nature—
that is, they regulate the boundaries among sovereigns; (2) rulings under 
implicit divestiture are appropriate exercises of federal common law, 
subject to congressional or executive override; (3) rulings under implicit 
divestiture are appropriate because they merely implement federal policy. 
This Part will address each of these potential justifications in turn to 
demonstrate why they are unconvincing.  
Before doing so, however, a little bit of history is necessary. Despite the 
ambiguity in the nature of its doctrine, the Court routinely examines Native 
American legal history for purposes of ascertaining the historical 
“dependent status” of the tribes. Each of the potential justifications for 
implicit divestiture relies heavily on the historical record and thus a sound 
understanding of that history is necessary to discuss them and understand 
why they each fail. Because the historical record speaks to all three 
potential justifications, I first offer a brief review of Native American legal 
history as refracted through the lens of recognition, with particular attention 
to the Act of 1871 by which Congress announced a new policy to 
discontinue the practice of treaty making with the tribes. Some scholars and 
judges, including Justice Thomas, treat this statute as a sovereignty Rubicon 
upon the passing of which, they allege, tribal sovereignty suffered a fatal 
blow, either as a matter of constitutional law or due to changed federal 
policy.
141
 Having discussed the historical record, I will then turn to the three 
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justifications mentioned above. I will also address, at the end of the Part, 
Justice Thomas’s larger theoretical concerns with Native American 
sovereignty jurisprudence. 
A. Native American Tribal Recognition – Some History 
1. Institutional Engagement Until the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
From the colonial period to 1871, Anglo-American governments 
interacted with Native American tribes generally on a nation-to-nation 
basis. English colonial governments recognized the sovereignty of Native 
American tribes and negotiated directly with them without much colonial 
coordination.
142
 Global conflict prompted a British reevaluation of the 
Empire’s institutional engagement with North American Indians and, 
during the French and Indian War, the Crown created two departments of 
Indian affairs in North America, one for the northern colonies and one for 
the southern colonies, and appointed commissioners for each.
143
 After the 
war, the Crown formulated a unitary policy toward Native Americans; such 
singularity was expressed in British Peace Treaties with the Iroquois in 
1768 and the Proclamation of 1763. 
                                                                                                                 
underscoring the importance of the Act of 1871. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, (Native) 
American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 489 (2005); Hope 
Babcock, A Possible Solution to the Problem of Diminishing Tribal Sovereignty, 90 N.D. L. 
REV. 13 (2014); DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 23, at 161 (“[I]t is long overdue that the 
federal government once again restrict itself to the exercise of the only clear traditional 
manner of dealing with Indian tribes — the treaty relationship.”). 
 142. See ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY 55 (3d ed. 2012). Despite their common 
allegiance to the Crown, colonial officials were free to formulate policies for their colonies 
that might differ from one another. As Mary Sarah Bilder has shown, the British Empire’s 
approach to colonial law allowed for legal divergence in the colonies from standards in the 
motherland, but not repugnance. See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC 
CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004). For example, the 
governments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania entered into the Treaty of Lancaster 
with the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in 1744. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS 
IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN TRIBES WITH ENGLISH 
COLONIES FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF 1744 (1984). New York was 
not party to the Treaty of Lancaster, even though it had been party to the Treaty of Albany in 
1722 with the same tribal nations. With continuing land disputes between Native Americans 
and Anglo settlers following the Treaty of Lancaster, Virginia re-negotiated with the Six 
Nations, and concluded the Treaty of Logstown in 1752, but without representation from 
previous participants Maryland and Pennsylvania. JAYME A. SOKOLOW, THE GREAT 
ENCOUNTER: NATIVE PEOPLES AND EUROPEAN SETTLERS IN THE AMERICAS 206 (2003). 
 143. See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 95 (Henry S. Commager & 
Richard B. Morris eds., 1975). 
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Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress asserted federal primacy 
in dealing with the tribes, but without real power to prevent the states from 
formulating their own policies.
144
 Following the Revolutionary War, 
Congress maintained the offices of Superintendents for Indian Affairs 
within the War Department, and continued to negotiate with the tribes 
through a treaty-making process.
145
 The Northwest Ordinance, passed by 
Congress in 1787 while the Constitutional Convention was meeting, and 
reauthorized by the first Congress under the Constitution in 1789, likewise 
enshrined high ideals for the treatment of Native tribes into law:  
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the 
Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them 
without their consent; and, in their property, rights and liberty, 
they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and 
lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws founded in justice 
and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing 




Despite the fact that the new nation consistently acted contrary to the ideals 
of the Northwest Ordinance, the notion that the United States should deal 
with tribes as sovereign entities and respect their sovereign powers was 
nevertheless written into American law from its founding. 
Absent, of course, from the Constitutional Convention, were 
representatives of tribes. This is not to say Indians were not on the minds of 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Prior to the Declaration of Independence, but after fighting between British forces 
and revolutionaries had already begun, the Continental Congress created three geographical 
departments for Indian Affairs, patterned after the Crown’s system, and appointed 
commissioners for each department including, among others, Benjamin Franklin and Patrick 
Henry. JAMES H. O'DONNELL III, SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23 
(1973). The commissioners’ immediate duty was to negotiate with various Indian tribes to 
procure their neutrality during the Revolutionary War. Congress even drafted a speech for 
the Commissioners: “This is a family quarrel between us and Old England. You Indians are 
not concerned in it. We don't wish you to take up the hatchet against the king's troops. We 
desire you to remain at home, and not join either side, but keep the hatchet buried deep.” Id. 
 145. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 236 (3d ed. 2009). 
Congress instructed superintendents of Indian Affairs to “maintain a constant friendly 
correspondence with the chiefs of the several nations within [their] district” and hold several 
“general and particular treaties from time to time.” U.S. War Office, Instructions to 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Department 1 (1787), https://www.loc.gov/ 
resource/bdsdcc.21401/?st=gallery.  
 146. Northwest Ordinance of 1787 art. III, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 340 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936). 
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the Framers. The Constitution of 1787 sought to address perceived defects 
relating to the United States’ relationship with tribes under the Articles, 
including the threat tribes posed to the United States militarily as well as 
the lack of coherence and unity in negotiating with tribes.
147
 The 
Constitution explicitly mentions “Indians” or “Indian Tribes” in two places. 
First, Article I, Section 2 excludes “Indians not taxed” from the population 
when counting persons for purposes of determining representation.
148
 The 
second, in Article I, Section 8, grants to Congress the power to regulate 
Commerce “with the Indian Tribes.”
149
 The “Indians not taxed” clause is a 
constitutional acknowledgment that Native American tribes owed 
allegiance to a sovereign other than the United States and its several states. 
The Indian Commerce Clause is a more explicit constitutional 
acknowledgment of tribal entities. As we shall see, the executive treaty-
making power in Article II, Section 2, though not explicitly mentioning 
tribal nations, also played an important role in federal and tribal relations 
from the founding until 1871.  
Congress’s Commerce Clause power relates to three entities: foreign 
nations, the states, and Indian tribes. While Congress has power to regulate 
commerce “among” the states, it has power to regulate commerce “with” 
foreign nations and Indian tribes. Read together, this tri-partite Commerce 
Clause suggests two things: (1) that the three entities mentioned have 
degrees of sovereignty; and (2) that Indian tribes do not, according to the 
Constitution, square neatly with either foreign nations or states.
150
  
The first U.S. Congress placed Native American relations within the War 
Department, where it had resided under the Articles of Confederation and 
where it would remain until the creation of the Department of the Interior in 
1849.
151
 The Bureau of Indian Affairs would later take on a more important 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2. This phrase was repeated in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Apportionment clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 150. Alex Tallchief Skibine argues that even if the Constitution does not guarantee tribal 
sovereignty, it acknowledges it. See Skibine, supra note 4, at 80 (“Although the sovereignty 
of Indian tribes may not be guaranteed or defined in the Constitution, this does not mean that 
the tribes have no constitutional status.”). 
 151. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 236 (3d ed. 2009). In 
1806, Congress created the Office of Indian Trade within the War Department, which was 
charged with maintaining a trading post network for trading with Native Americans. In 
1824, without authorization from Congress, Secretary of War John Calhoun created the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs within his department. Congress later formally established an office 
of Indian Affairs in 1832, whose office and officers remained located in the War Department 
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and outsized role in the formulation of Indian policy in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, continuing well into the twentieth century. However, in 
the early Republic, Congress aggressively asserted itself in the devising of 
Indian policy, and executive interaction with tribes occurred mainly outside 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
152
 Beginning with its first session, Congress 
repeatedly passed Indian Non-Intercourse Acts primarily aimed at codifying 
the inalienability of tribal lands and establishing federal primacy over the 
states in interacting with tribes.
153
 The Acts prevented the sale or grant of 
tribal lands to anyone without approval from the national government.
154
 
The Acts were aimed, in part, to preserve tribal sovereignty by ensuring that 
tribal territory remained intact.
155
 However, such acts were a two-edged 
sword for sovereignty because not only did they establish federal primacy 
over the states, they also established federal primacy over the tribes. In 
disallowing the private sale of traditional tribal lands, the federal 
government assumed the power to determine the boundaries of tribal lands. 
Thus Congress, at the founding, simultaneously recognized and curtailed 
tribal sovereignty. This dual role of the federal government—conqueror and 
self-proclaimed protectorate of tribal sovereigns—persists to the present. 
Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830, signed into law by 
President Andrew Jackson.
156
 The Act was the culmination of lengthy 
dialogue between southern states and the federal government. Acculturation 
                                                                                                                 
until 1849 when the Department of the Interior was created. See STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, 
INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 78, 247 
(2010). 
 152. Congress, however, did not dominate federal Indian policy at the founding. Indeed, 
it is arguable that a vigorous executive branch under George Washington set the agenda. See, 
e.g., Greg Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015). 
 153. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.03, at 35. 
 154. Whereas early iterations of the law contained statutory expiration dates, the Non-
Intercourse Act of 1834 was permanent and remains codified. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
 155. George Washington told the Seneca after passage of the Non-Intercourse Act of 
1790, “Here then is the security for the remainder of your lands . . . . The general 
government will never consent to your being defrauded. But it will protect you in all your 
just rights.” Reply of George Washington to the Seneca Chiefs (Dec. 29, 1790), reprinted in 
7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 146-50 (Jack D. Warren, Jr. 
ed., 1998). “The [Indian Non-Intercourse Act] . . . embodies the policy of the United States 
to acknowledge and guarantee the Indian tribes' right of occupancy of tribal lands and to 
prevent the tribes from disposing of their land improvidently.”  Narragansett Indian Tribe of 
Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 296 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D.R.I. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005), vacated en banc, 415 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2005), on reh’g, 449 
F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006). 
 156. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. 
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policies set in place during Washington’s administration remained the 
official policy of the federal government until the Age of Jackson.
157
 
Acculturation, according to Christian Keller, was the policy by which the 
federal government recognized tribal sovereignty and self-government east 
of the Mississippi River conditioned upon the tribes adopting Anglo 
behaviors in government, industry and religion.
158
 However, since at least 
the Jefferson administration, if not earlier, southern states, particularly 
Georgia, agitated for removal policies that would allow them to control 
tribal lands.
159
 Meeting with some federal resistance to the idea, and being 
impatient, Georgia began removing Native Americans without federal 
authorization.
160
 Continued federal policy asserting primacy over states 
with respect to Native Americans demanded that the federal government 
act. Congress did not simply order the military removal of Native 
Americans without a pretense of negotiation. Rather, it passed the Removal 
Act, set aside federal land west of the Mississippi River, and authorized the 
President to negotiate land exchanges with the southeastern tribes.
161
 Such 
land exchanges were made through treaties. To be sure removal would 
occur, the removal treaties were negotiated at the end of a rifle—offers the 
tribes could not refuse—but the federal government at least paid lip service 
to tribal sovereignty by going through the motions of negotiating with the 
tribes on a nation-to-nation basis. In these actions, the United States 
continued to recognize the tribes’ sovereignty, even as it was exercising 
military dominance over them.
162
 
                                                                                                                 
 157. For a discussion of the shift from policies of acculturation to those of removal, see 
Christian Keller, Philanthropy Betrayed: Thomas Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, and the 
Origins of Federal Indian Removal Policy, 144 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 39 (2000). 
 158. Id. at 45.  
 159. Id. at 54-55. 
 160. Id. at 55. 
 161. Indian Removal Act of 1830, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. at 411-12. 
 162. Two interpretations of the actions of Jackson and Congress are generally offered, 
and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first posits that Jackson was acting in 
concert with the south to deprive Native Americans of their territorial sovereignty to enrich 
Anglo-Americans. The second, more charitable interpretation of Jackson’s actions, as put 
forth by Robert Remini, was that there was tension between the federal government and 
southern states and Jackson, recognizing that tribal sovereignty would be completely lost 
through acculturation in the states, genuinely thought the best way to protect tribal 
sovereignty was to remove the Indians from states into federal territory where the federal 
government would be on more solid legal and literal ground to serve as “guardians” of their 
“ward.” That is, the federal government could hold vast lands in trust for Native Americans, 
thereby protecting their sovereignty. In either case, though, Jackson and Congress at least 
acknowledged theoretical tribal sovereignty by negotiating removal treaties either under 
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Against this backdrop of removal, the Supreme Court first fully entered 
the fray of Native American sovereignty. In three seminal cases now 
referred to as the Marshall Trilogy, the Court struggled to find where in the 
American constitutional system Native Indians fit.
163
 Given the continued 
precedential value of the Marshall Trilogy, and the enduring 
characterization found therein, for better or worse, of Native American 
tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” the Trilogy is well-trod scholarly 
ground.
164
 The brief review here is limited to analyzing the Marshall 
Trilogy through the lens of the recognition power.  
The first of the Trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh,
165
 had its roots in Fletcher 
v. Peck.
166
 In Fletcher, the Court entertained the theory that tribes did not 
occupy tribal lands in fee simple,
167
 an idea that found full expression in 
M’Intosh thirteen years later. There, the Court held Native American tribal 
land to be inalienable—unless the sale was accompanied by the approval of 
the federal government.
168
 Though not basing its ruling on the Non-
Intercourse Acts, the Court nevertheless reinforced the policy behind them 
by acknowledging tribal sovereignty while simultaneously curtailing it, in 
the service of establishing the primacy of federal law over state common 
law.
169
 The roots of the Federal-Native American Trust Relationship 
regarding real property are found in M’Intosh. “All our institutions 
recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of 
occupancy, . . . [which is] incompatible with an absolute and complete title 
in the Indians.”
170
 Marshall appealed to the law of nations to reach his 
ruling, which “laws” recognized an almost unfettered right in the Crown 
(and its American successor) to control indigenously occupied land.
171
  
                                                                                                                 
threat of force or after force had already been implemented. See 2 ROBERT V. REMINI, 
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832 (1981). 
 163. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  
 164. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. 
REV. 627 (2006); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the 
Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next 
Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651 (2009).  
 165. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543. 
 166. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 167. Id. at 117-19. 
 168. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 588. 
 171. Id. at 574.  
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In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
172
 the Court held that the Cherokee 
Nation did not have standing to sue in federal court to challenge Georgia’s 
incursions into its sovereignty, as it was not a state and not a foreign 
sovereign.
173
 It is in this case that Marshall first referred to Native tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations,” as well as a “ward” in need of a 
“guardian”
174
—characterizations that have permeated federal Indian law to 
the present. Cherokee Nation was a fractured opinion, with Justice Joseph 
Story—who would have granted standing to the tribe and heard the case on 
the merits—joining the dissent.
175
 Story later privately expressed his 
satisfaction that some of the negative implications of Cherokee Nation were 
effectively overruled the following year in Worcester v. Georgia,
176
 
exclaiming, “Thanks be to God . . . the Court can wash their hands clean of 
the iniquity of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights.”
177
  
The State of Georgia had detained a Christian minister, Samuel 
Worcester, for proselyting to the Cherokee without a state-issued license.
178
 
Worcester challenged his detention in federal court.
179
 The Court held that 
the State of Georgia could not interfere with Worcester’s activities on the 
basis that the tribes were considered, under the Constitution and in treaties, 
as separate, distinct communities.
180
 While protecting the tribes from state 
intrusion, the seeds of federal plenary power remained undisturbed. In 
Worcester, the Court did not issue orders to the federal government, but did 
order Georgia to release Worcester.
181
 Georgia dragged its feet and Jackson 
helped little. Ultimately, Georgia relented, owing less to the Court’s order 
than to political sentiment in Georgia itself. The immediate effect of the 
Worcester opinion was limited; federal removal policies continued 
                                                                                                                 
 172. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 173. Id. at 20. 
 174. Id. at 17. 
 175. Id. at 34 (Thompson, J., joined by Story, J., dissenting). 
 176. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  
 177. R. KENT NEWMEYER, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 
215-16 (1985). Whatever the deficiencies of M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation, one might still 
sympathize with John Marshall, whose practice was to avoid a constitutional showdown and 
preserve the viability of the judiciary in national affairs. Had the Court granted the Cherokee 
Nation standing and ruled in its favor, Marshall would be in the position of issuing an order 
to either the State of Georgia or the federal executive, or both. Marshall, who recognized the 
futility of issuing a writ of mandamus to Thomas Jefferson almost thirty years earlier, would 
have certainly recognized the futility of issuing a writ of mandamus to Andrew Jackson.  
 178. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 538. 
 179. Id. at 537-38.  
 180. Id. at 559. 
 181. Id. at 562.  
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unabated and more than 4000 Native Americans lost their lives along the 
Trail of Tears.
182
 Nevertheless, Marshall embedded a principle of retained 
sovereignty into the constitutional framework. Tribes retained theoretical 
sovereignty if they had not surrendered it via treaty. Such sovereignty 
received constitutional protection from state incursions. However, the 
question of federal power to disrupt sovereignty came to the fore in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. 
2. Tribal Recognition – Mid to Late Nineteenth Century 
The idea of a separate Department of the Interior long preceded the 
Mexican-American War, but did not get off the ground until the United 
States acquired 529,000 additional square miles from Mexico as part of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
183
 As the nation expanded its borders to the 
Pacific, a reevaluation of Indian policy became necessary. Having pushed 
tribal nations continually west, the nation began to run out of an 
unorganized “West.” Robert Walker, President James K. Polk’s Treasury 
Secretary, drafted a bill to create a Department of the Interior and 
shepherded it through Congress.
184
 Over the objections of John C. Calhoun, 
Congress created the Department the day before Polk left office and moved 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs there.
185
  
The transfer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to the Department of 
the Interior marked a shift in the bureaucratic treatment of tribal nations. 
While the United States continued to negotiate with tribes through the 
treaty-making process until 1871, and although the United States Army 
continued to “assist” in the realm of Indian affairs, the transfer denoted that 
tribal relations became less a matter of foreign affairs and more a matter of 
domestic concern, involving subjects, if not citizens, of the United States.  
Just two years following the creation of the Department of the Interior, 
Congress began creating the reservation system. It did so by allocating 
funds for reservations in the Indian Appropriation Bill of 1851.
186
 Tensions 
between Trans-Mississippi whites and Native Americans, including those 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Ronald N. Satz, The Cherokee Trail of Tears: A Sesquicentennial Perspective, 73 
GA. HIST. Q. 431 (1989). 
 183. See Henry Barrett Learned, The Establishment of the Secretaryship of the Interior, 
16 AM. HIST. REV. 751, 751 (1911). 
 184. Id. at 763-71. 
 185. See 26 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN: 1848-1849, at 337 (Clyde N. Wilson, 
Shirley B. Cook & Alexander Moore eds., 2003); see also Debate of Mar. 3, 1849, CONG. 
GLOBE 30th Cong., 2nd Sess. 666 (1849). 
 186. Ch. 14, 9 Stat. 574, 586-87. 
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who forced from the southeast on the Trail of Tears led to the creation of 
reservations in Oklahoma, to be followed elsewhere.
187
 As with removal, 
the charitable interpretation of the creation of reservations was that the 
federal government acted with paternalistic regard for the integrity of 
Native American sovereignty. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando 
Brown explained the rationale of the reservation system as designed to 
create well-defined boundaries that could be policed by the federal 
government.
188
 In reality though, under the reservation system the policies 
of removal and acculturation were combined, while tribal sovereignty 
received continued recognition, albeit increasingly curtailed. No longer 
charged with merely administering a network of trade with the tribes, the 
BIA began administering the reservation system.
189
 The BIA took on a new 
direction, becoming more aggressive in advocating a particular kind of 
Indian policy—one hostile to tribal sovereignty.
190
 Supreme Court case law 
from the late nineteenth century reflects then extant BIA policy and 
continues to hold precedential value today.
191
  
3. The Act of 1871 
Following the Civil War, Congress turned its attention more fully to the 
West.
192
 In an effort to protect overland trade routes, especially railroads, 
and to avoid the high cost of protecting western settlements militarily,
193
 
Congress sought to establish peace with and among Plains Indians. In July 
1867, Congress passed a bill authorizing the creation of a seven-man 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See WASHBURN, supra note 143, at 192.  
 188. Id. at 191-92.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Sidney Harring states that the BIA engaged in a sustained and systematic effort to 
extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S 
CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 115 (1994). For a summary of critiques against the BIA, see Robert 
McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American 
Indians, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1 (2004). 
 191. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 
375 (1886). 
 192. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (2007). 
 193. Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, one of the commissioners charged with negotiating 
the treaties of 1867, wrote to the Secretary of War that “if fifty Indians are allowed to remain 
between the Arkansas and Platte we will have to guard every stage station, every train, and 
all railroad working patties. In other words, fifty hostile Indians will checkmate three 
thousand soldiers.” Quoted in Letter to the Secretary of the Interior from N. G. Taylor, 
Commissioner (July 12, 1867), reprinted in S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-13, at 1, 4 (1867). 
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commission with the express aim of accomplishing these goals.
194
 Congress 
instructed the commission to select two new sites for reservations and 
persuade Indians to abandon their nomadic life in exchange for agricultural 
pursuits.
195
 Should the commissioners fail to achieve peace, the bill 
authorized the Secretary of War to raise an army to accomplish the tasks 
through force.
196
 Thus, the “Peace” Commission carried with it the threat of 




In exchange for relocation to reservations, the United States promised 
homes, schoolhouses, churches, teachers, agriculture implements, livestock 
and other buildings and tools, so that the reservations might become 
“crucibles of assimilation.”
198
 Although the Senate ratified the treaties, the 
House of Representatives resented being locked out of the process because 
the agreements contained many expenditure decisions that included 
provisions to transfer land taken from tribes directly to railroads and other 
private interests.
199
 The selection of railroad locations continued to be a 
source of high stakes congressional debate, negotiation and compromise.
200
 
Francis A. Walker, who served as Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 
1871 to 1872, described that the House of Representatives had a “growing 
jealousy” toward the Senate who obligated the House to fund treaty-
provisions “without inquiry.”
201
 Even as early as 1867, the House of 
Representatives had expressed its discontent with having to fulfill treaty 
obligations without being able to offer input on ratification. The House 
managed to insert a provision into an appropriations act purporting to repeal 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Kerry R. Oman, The Beginning Of The End: The Indian Peace Commission of 1867-
1868, 22 GREAT PLAINS Q. 35, 37 (2002), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplains 
quarterly/2353. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 35. 
 198. Bethany R. Berger, Birthright Citizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185, 1201 (2016); see also George William 
Rice, Note, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. Sec. 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a Self-
Limitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 240 (1977).  
 199. Berger, supra note 198, at 1200-01. 
 200. The location of the transcontinental railroad was at the heart of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act of 1854, by which Stephen Douglas procured southern support for a northern route by 
allowing the question of slavery in the newly organized territories to be determined by 
popular sovereignty. See, e.g., NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS: CONTESTED LIBERTY 
IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 9-28 (2004). 
 201. FRANCIS WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 5, 11-12 (1874), quoted in FELIX COHEN'S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 67 (Univ. of N.M. Press photo. reprint 1971) (1942). 
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“all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the 
commissioner of Indian affairs to enter into treaties with any Indian 
tribes . . . .”
202
 The constitutionality of this Act was never put before the 
courts. The Act was repealed a few months later, perhaps because Congress 
realized that the law allowing the President to enter into treaties—the law it 
sought to repeal—is in Article II of the Constitution.
203
 
Due to the new treaties of 1867, an intra-branch debate between the two 
houses of Congress was re-ignited over the appropriate role of the House in 
negotiations with Native Tribes.
204
 In 1869, the House flatly refused to 
appropriate funds to fulfill the new treaty obligations, to the embarrassment 
of the executive.
205
 When the next session of Congress convened, the House 
relented but insisted on including a provision that “nothing in this act . . . 
shall be so construed as to ratify or approve any treaty made with any 
tribes, bands, or parties of Indians.”
206
 The Senate had already ratified the 




In 1871, when the two chambers were again deadlocked, the House 
renewed the tactic it had previously used to assert its role in Indian affairs 
by invoking its appropriation authority in the Constitution.
208
 The 
appropriations bill, passed by the Senate, came back from the conference 
committee with the following proviso:  
Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the 
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or 
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom 
the United States may contract by treaty: Provided further, that 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or 
impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and 
ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.
209
 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Act of Mar. 20, 1867, ch. 13, § 6, 15 Stat. 7. Congressional records do not reveal 
discussion on congressional authority to “repeal” Article II of the Constitution. The Act of 
1871 adopted a more measured approach in its attempt to insert Congress more fully into 
recognition and treaty-making powers. 
 203. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 16, § 5, 15 Stat. 13, 40.  
 204. Clinton, supra note 21, at 167; see also Rice, supra note 198, at 240.  
 205. ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE 
INDIAN, 1866-1891, at 215 n.4 (1979). 
 206. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, § 5, 15 Stat. at 40. 
 207. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 56-58 (1927). 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 209. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). 
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Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky strenuously objected to the provision on 
constitutional grounds.
210
 He viewed it as an inappropriate intrusion into the 
presidential power to “determine what tribes of Indians he will make 
treaties with, and what he will not.”
211
 However, Senator James Harlan, 
former Secretary of the Interior, argued that the bill in effect did nothing 
more than allow the House to participate in decisions “usually effected by 
the stipulations of treaties.”
212
 Specifically, he pointed to a bill passed the 
previous year authorizing the sale of Indian lands “with the consent of the 
Indians, under a contract to be made with them by the President.”
213
 Senator 
Harlan’s characterization of the statute is not one of ordinary legislation for 
Indians, but one of the House’s involvement in the process of contracting 
agreements with Indian tribes. Over the objections of Senator Davis, and at 
the prodding of President Grant, who was anxious to fulfill the treaty 
obligations, the Senate approved the bill. From that point forward, the 
United States ceased treaty negotiations with Native tribes, although it has 
continued to honor some pre-1871 treaties while abrogating others.
214
 
Senator Harlan’s statement in support of the constitutionality of the 
statute (the Act of 1871)—that it merely reorganized the manner in which 
the United States entered into agreements with Native American tribes qua 
tribes—is an early allusion to treaty-substitutes. “Treaty-substitutes” is the 
phrase that has come to denote those agreements between sovereign entities 
that do not use the traditional and formal language and procedures of 
treaties, but nevertheless recognize negotiations and agreements between 




                                                                                                                 
 210. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1822 (1871). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), the Supreme Court held that 
Congress could unilaterally abrogate treaties with Native American tribes under a theory of 
plenary power.  
 215. G. William Rice, Francis Paul Prucha, and others have discussed the use of treaty-
substitutes in Native American affairs. See Rice, supra note 198, at 247; see also FRANCIS 
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 173, 
233 (1994). Outside the context of Native American sovereignty, the United States uses a 
treaty-substitute process in its dealings with Taiwan. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations 
Act, creating a conduit for diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan 
outside PRC channels. Pub. L. No. 96–8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). The Taiwan Relations Act was 
signed into law by President Carter, who had also unilaterally abrogated the Sino-American 
Mutual Defense Act. The United States and Taiwan conduct bilateral talks and enter into 
direct agreements. On December 16, 2015, the Obama administration announced a deal to 
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What is the legal effect of the Act of 1871? There are at least two 
competing interpretations:(1) that the statute de-recognizes the sovereignty 
of Indian tribes and nations, effectively announcing their complete conquest 
and assimilation, rendering them subject to full legislative power of the 
federal government;
216
 and (2) that the statute does not de-recognize their 
status as sovereign nation, but merely alters the method of “ratifying” 
agreements with them.
217
 The historical record reveals that the political 
branches continued to recognize tribal sovereignty and continued to 
negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements with the tribes after 1871, 
with some notable exceptions. The Court, for its part, did not interpret the 
Act of 1871 as a sovereignty Rubicon prior to the rise of implicit 
divestiture. 
4. Early Interpretations of the Act of 1871 (1872-1884) 
The year following the Act of 1871, in Holden v. Joy, the Supreme Court 
was called upon to determine the status of the Cherokee Nation in a 
property dispute involving former Cherokee lands.
218
 After citing the Act of 
1871, the Court stated, 
Indian tribes are States in a certain sense, though not foreign 
States, or States of the United States . . . [A]cts of our 
government, both in the executive and legislative departments, 
plainly recognize such tribes or nations as States, and the courts 
of the United States are bound by those acts.
219
 
This language echoed the language used by Senator Eugene Casserly during 
the debate over passage of the Act. Senator Casserly said that an Indian 
tribe is  
                                                                                                                 
sell $1.83 billion worth of arms to the ROC Armed Forces, a year and eight months after the 
U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act 
of 2014 to allow for the sale. See David Brunnstrom & Arshad Mohammed, U.S. Plans to 
Sell Taiwan About $1.42 Billion in Arms, REUTERS (June 29, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms/u-s-plans-to-sell-taiwan-about-1-42-billion-in-arms-
idUSKBN19K2XO; Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-276, § 102, 128 
Stat. 2989, 2989 (2014). The deal would include the sale of two decommissioned U.S. Navy 
frigates, anti-tank missiles, Assault Amphibious Vehicles, and FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air 
missiles. See Brunnstrom & Mohammed, supra. 
 216. Rice, supra note 198, at 240-41.  
 217. Id. at 241. 
 218. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872). 
 219. Id. at 242. 
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like a State under a protectorate, a State quasi independent, 
having certain distinct and separate rights and yet subject to the 
control of another State. . . . It is not easy to define expressly 
their political relation to the United States . . . more independent 
than the States, less independent than foreign nations.
220
  
The Court’s early judicial interpretation of the Act of 1871 indicates that it 
did not believe the political branches had fully de-recognized the sovereign 
status of tribes and nations.  
The Court encountered another chance to consider the meaning of the 
Act of 1871 in Elk v. Wilkins, decided in 1884.
221
 John Elk, a Winnebago 
Indian, petitioned the Court to declare him a United States citizen by reason 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and his voluntary 
separation from his tribe.
222
 The Court denied his claim, finding that Indians 
born of tribes or nations were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States at birth, and were therefore excluded from citizenship without 
naturalization, the only other avenue to citizenship.
223
 When analyzing the 
Act of 1871, the Court stated that its “utmost possible effect [was] to 
require Indian tribes be dealt with for the future through the legislative and 
not the treaty-making power.”
224
 Although the phrase “dealt with” is itself 
ambiguous, the Court’s holding that Elk was not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States only makes sense if there remained continued 
recognition of tribal sovereignty after 1871. Had the tribes been de-
recognized by the statute, the Court would have had to hold John Elk was 
now a citizen of the United States and his respective state. But the Court did 
not do so. Even as late as 1896, well into the Allotment Era, the Court held 
the Fifth Amendment had no operation within tribal courts on the basis that 
Constitutional due process protections did not extend to pre-existing 
sovereigns.
225
 Thus, the effect of the Act of 1871, in its early 
interpretations, was not a wholesale de-recognition of tribal sovereignty; 
rather, it marked a change in the method of federal agreements made with 
Indian tribes (from treaty making and ratification) to legislative approval. 
G. William Rice argues that Elk v. Wilkins is a “definitive statement that the 
                                                                                                                 
 220. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1824 (1871). 
 221. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 222. Id. at 95. 
 223. Id. at 109; see Berger, supra note 198, at 1197 (arguing the holding in Elk v. Wilkins 
was consistent with the desires of certain framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect 
Native Sovereignty by excluding Indians from application of the Citizenship Clause). 
 224. Elk, 112 U.S. at 107.  
 225. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
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utmost effect of the statute was a change in the method of the United States’ 
ratification of an agreement between two international bodies politic.”
226
 
In the 1870s and early 1880s, the Supreme Court continued to interpret 
the relationship between the United States and the tribes as one of 
sovereign-to-sovereign, though not equal sovereigns. Did the political 
branches agree? Congress continued to appropriate money for Indian 
affairs. In 1876, in an appropriation act, Congress included a proviso that 
no further monies would be appropriated for the Sioux until the Sioux 
entered into an agreement with the President for the cession of the Black 
Hills.
227
 If the Sioux lacked sovereignty after 1871, there would have been 
no need for Congress or the President to insist on their agreement, extorted 
as it may have been, to cede the Black Hills. 
5. Allotment and Assimilation 
Although the Act of 1871 caused no immediate change in the United 
States’ relations with the tribes, two pieces of congressional legislation in 
the 1880s brought federal plenary power down from the realm of theory to 
actuality. Beginning with the Major Crimes Act of 1885,
228
 the United 
States entered into a new era of federal-tribal relations. For the first time, 
Congress sought to legislate on Indian-on-Indian crime within Indian 
Country, and laid the groundwork for the first of two concerted efforts by 
the political branches to de-recognize tribes.  
Prior to the Civil War, the BIA assisted with removal and early 
reservation systems. Following the Civil War, the BIA aggressively sought 
to fully assimilate Native Americans. According to Sidney Harring, the BIA 
formulated an assimilationist policy and then pushed that policy on 
Congress, rather than the other way around.
229
 Part of that effort was to 
extend criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans, either at the federal 
level or the state level.
230
 Meeting resistance at both levels, the BIA 
deliberately sought a test case by which it could either judicially establish 
the federal power to prosecute or, if denied, publicize, sensationalize and 
use it as “Exhibit A” in asking Congress for explicit criminal jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Rice, supra note 198, at 241. 
 227. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 280, 19 Stat. 176, 192. 
 228. Ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
 229. HARRING, supra note 190, at 134, 135-36 (“Since 1874, the BIA had been 
attempting to persuade Congress to extend federal jurisdiction over certain serious 
crimes . . . . The Senate had rejected the BIA’s original 1874 proposal for a major crimes act 
because such legislation was inconsistent with existing notions of tribal sovereignty.”). 
 230. Id. at 134. 
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 The BIA found such a case in Ex parte Crow Dog,
232
 in 
which the Supreme Court declined to extend federal criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Territory for Indian-on-Indian crime in the face of ambiguous treaty 
provisions.
233
 The Court’s decision in Crow Dog was one of judicial 
minimalism and pragmatism, refusing to divest the tribes of exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction when confronted with contradictory and unclear 
federal law.
234
 At the instigation of the BIA, the case received negative 
publicity. The New York Times reported,  
The Supreme Court has rendered a decision which will startle 
most readers. The decision is that there are persons living in the 
United States and not subject to the jurisdiction of any State or 
Federal Court. Those persons are Indians living in Indian 
reservations who commit crimes against other Indians.
235
  
Congress, in short order, passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885, explicitly 
granting federal jurisdiction in Indian Territory over seven major Indian-on-
Indian crimes.
236
 The Major Crimes Act did not remove tribal jurisdiction 
for the same crimes and left in place exclusive tribal jurisdiction for all 
other crimes.  
In considering the Major Crimes Act, it is important to consider not only 
what Congress did, but what Congress did not do. Congress could have 
gone much further in intruding upon Native American tribal sovereignty, 
but chose not to. In contrast to the BIA proposal, which resulted in the 
Major Crimes Act, the Indian Rights Association—a quintessentially 
progressive organization that sought to “civilize” and Christianize all 
Native Americans—proposed an “Act to Provide for the Establishment of 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. at 102. 
 232. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 233. Id. at 571-72. 
 234. Crow Dog contrasts starkly with modern cases of implicit divestiture where the 
Court, when faced with similar ambiguity regarding federal and tribal jurisdiction generally 
reads into their relationship a loss of tribal sovereignty. The Court in Crow Dog showed 
judicial restraint, presuming retained sovereignty in the absence of clear federal policy, a 
model the Court ought to consider following in the modern era. 
 235. The Rights of Crow Dog, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1883, at 4. Bryan Wildenthal states 
that the “somewhat hysterical public reaction to this decision [was] orchestrated by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.” BRYAN H. WILDENTHAL, NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY ON 
TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, AND DOCUMENTS 70 (2003). 
 236. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1153. 
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Courts and Criminal Jurisdiction upon Indian Reservations.”
237
 Harring 
states that this act “would have put Indians under the complete legal force 
of U.S. law with few due process protections” and “was a far more 
repressive criminal apparatus to deal with misdemeanors and offenses 
against white standards of morality.”
238
 The BIA and Congress rejected this 
proposal, adopting the less intrusive Major Crimes Act. 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act the year 
after it was passed in United States v. Kagama.
239
 At issue was the source 
of congressional power to legislate generally in Indian Territory. 
Interestingly, the Court specifically rejected the Indian Commerce Clause 
as the source of congressional police power.
240
 Rather, the Court used a 
theory of congressional plenary power based in conquest, paternalism and 
racism.
241
 The Court depicted a binary form of federalism, stating that in 
the United States constitutional system there can be only “these two” 
sovereigns, the federal government and the state government.
242
 The Court 
thus depicted Indian Territory as a sovereign vacuum, in need of federal 
plenary authority. Kagama is an early case of judicial de-recognition.
243
 By 
ignoring the existence of tribal sovereignty, the Court went beyond what 
Congress actually said and did in the Major Crimes Act, which did not 
purport to extinguish the tribes or their power to prosecute criminal 
offenses, both major and minor. Whereas the Court was quick to depict 
federal plenary power as engulfing tribal sovereignty, Congress had merely 
created concurrent jurisdiction. 
The Indian Rights Association, though rebuffed by Congress in 1885 
with the Major Crimes Act, did receive one big item on its wish list when 
                                                                                                                 
 237. HARRING, supra note 190, at 134-35. 
 238. Id. 
 239. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 240. Id. at 379. 
 241. See Lesley Karen Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the 
Inadequacy of the State Land Trusts, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 519, 553 (1992); see also David C. 
Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. 
REV. 759, 777 (1991). 
 242. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379. Justice Thomas, while criticizing Kagama for failing to 
locate a textual hook for congressional plenary power, apparently buys into the Kagama 
framework that sovereignty can only exist in the federal government or state government. He 
states that tribes are separate sovereigns or they are not, implicitly rejecting Marshall’s 
domestic dependent nations framework. Suspicious also of federal plenary power, Justice 
Thomas therefore lays the groundwork for the argument that tribes can only be recognized as 
sovereign through a treaty making process or they are otherwise subject to state jurisdiction. 
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215-18 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 243. See HARRING, supra note 190, at 142.  
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Congress passed the Dawes Act of 1887.
244
 In this legislation, Congress 
allotted land to individual tribal members to be held in trust for twenty-five 
years and thereafter to be held by the individual in fee simple.
245
 The 
legislation also provided for the sale of the “surplus” of the reservation to 
non-Indian buyers, to be held in fee simple immediately.
246
 The Dawes Act 
was the first of two full-scale legislative assaults on tribal sovereignty. 
Private ownership of land within reservations would, it was thought, lead 
not only to Indian assimilation, but also to complete state criminal and civil 
jurisdiction when the last parcel was sold and the federal trust relationship 
ended.
247
 Allotment proceeded for the next fifty years, creating a 
checkerboard pattern of land ownership within reservations, but never 
reaching its twin goals of privatizing all land ownership and extinguishing 
tribal sovereignty.
248
 Approximately ninety million acres were transferred 
from Indian to non-Indian control during the Allotment Era.
249
 
6. Recognition of Tribal Sovereignty in the Early Twentieth Century 
Assimilation efforts, like other Progressive Era policies, continued well 
into the twentieth century and culminated with the Citizenship Act of 
1924.
250
 Native Americans had, since the founding, been excluded from 
citizenship, with various exceptions for things like private land ownership 
and military service.
251
 Even the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which states that “All persons born . . . in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,”
252
 
did not grant citizenship to Native Americans because they were not, 
generally speaking, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.
253
 By 
1924, roughly 58% of Native Americans were already citizens, including 
those who had acquired citizenship through land ownership (allotted or 
                                                                                                                 
 244. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
 245. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. § 6, 24 Stat. at 390 (“[E]very member of the respective . . . tribes of Indians to 
whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit and be subject to the laws, both civil 
and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside . . . .”); see also HARRING, 
supra note 190, at 154. 
 248. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 73, 78. 
 249. Id. § 1.04, at 73. 
 250. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (repealed 1952). 
 251. COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 78-79. 
 252. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 253. See Berger, supra note 198, at 1196. 
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otherwise), as well as due to service in the United States military.
 254
 The 
Citizenship Act of 1924 granted blanket citizenship to all Native 
Americans—no naturalization process was required and no consent was 
requested.
255
 Some tribes explicitly refused to recognize the Citizenship 
Act’s applicability to them.
256
 The Citizenship Act was passed the same 
year as the Immigration Act of 1924, which sought to preserve an 
“American” identity by restricting immigration from various regions.
257
 
Despite progressive efforts to homogenize American society, the 
Citizenship Act, importantly, did not require individuals to give up their 
tribal citizenship, as previous naturalization processes had done.
258
 The 
Citizenship Act sought to accomplish the goals of assimilation without 
explicitly de-recognizing tribal authority. 
The Court acquiesced to the political branches during the assimilationist 
period, not questioning congressional plenary power. Whereas in 
Worcester, the Court’s characterization of tribes as sovereign entities served 
to protect them to some degree from state intrusion, such characterization 
was of no avail to protect them from federal power. The Court’s holding in 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock made clear that the Court found no constitutional 
protection for tribes from the national government itself.
259
 There, the Court 
held Congress could abrogate a treaty with an Indian tribe based on its 
plenary power—a decision firmly rooted in paternalistic theories of the 
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.
260
 Paternalism lay 
at the heart of another Court decision during the Progressive and 
Assimilation Eras in United States v. Sandoval.
261
 When New Mexico and 
Arizona joined the United States as the last of the forty-eight contiguous 
states in early 1912, the status of its native peoples was called into question 
by the enabling acts of Congress. The Supreme Court had previously 
excluded the Pueblo of New Mexico from the definition of “Indian” when 
interpreting the Non-Intercourse Act of 1834,
262
 based upon their perceived 
                                                                                                                 
 254. See Kevin Bruyneel, Challenging American Boundaries: Indigenous People and the 
"Gift" of U.S. Citizenship, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 30 (2004). 
 255. 43 Stat. at 253; see COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 78-79. 
 256. For a discussion of the withholding of consent, see Bruyneel, supra note 254. 
 257. Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952); see Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race 
in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. 
HIST. 67 (1999). 
 258. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.04, at 79. 
 259. 187 U.S. 553, 555 (1903). 
 260. See id. at 566.  
 261. 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).  
 262. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
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capacity for self-government as well as their fee simple ownership of 
land.
263
 The Enabling Act for New Mexico, however, extended the Non-
Intercourse Act and related legislation explicitly to the Pueblo, bringing 
them within the guardian-ward relationship.
264
 The Court in Sandoval found 
these provisions of the Enabling Act caused no constitutional harm either to 
the tribes or to the newly created State of New Mexico.
265
 The Court’s 
justification for intrusion into tribal, and potentially state, sovereignty was 
the plenary power first articulated in Kagama as well as explicitly racial 
categorizations underlying the guardian-ward construct.
266
 
While not abandoning the guardian-ward relationship, federal policies 
toward native tribes began to change in the 1930s. The political branches’ 
efforts to re-assert tribal culture and self-determination, if not full-scale 
sovereignty, began in earnest with the efforts of John Collier. Collier, a 
sociologist who valued community cohesion over stark individualism, 
sought to reverse some assimilationist policies, including allotment, by 
advocating Indian cultural retention and self-government.
267
 President 
Franklin Roosevelt appointed Collier as the Commissioner of the BIA in 
1933, and he served during the entirety of Roosevelt’s administration.
268
 
Collier pushed for and obtained the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934,
269
 the centerpiece of the “Indian New Deal.” The Indian New Deal 
ended the allotment process but did not effectuate a wholesale repeal of the 
Dawes Act.
270
 Rather, it allowed the United States to buy fee simple land 
and then return it to its pre-existing status—that of federal land held in trust 
for the tribes.
271
 The Indian New Deal also called for constitution-making 
among the tribes, and those tribes that accepted the New Deal adopted tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 263. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616, 618 (1876) 
 264. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 560; see COHEN, supra note 140, § 
1.03, at 57-58. 
 265. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46. 
 266. See, for example, the Court’s statement that the Pueblos adhere “to primitive modes 
of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed according to 
the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed, 
and inferior people.” Id. at 39. 
 267. See KENNETH R. PHILIP, JOHN COLLIER’S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, 1920-1954, 
at xii (1977). 
 268. Id. at xiv, 117.  
 269. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5129). 
 270. PHILIP, supra note 267, at 159. 
 271. For a compilation of cases addressing the constitutionality of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, including the provisions allowing the re-purchase of former tribal lands, 
see Ann K. Wooster, J.D., Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act, 28 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 563 (2008). 
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constitutions based upon a model drafted by the BIA.
272
 In this regard, the 
Indian New Deal “fought” one form assimilation by introducing another—
the imposition of western-style constitutionalism as a condition for 
continued recognition. 
Nevertheless, the Indian New Deal was an effort by the political 
branches to re-recognize aspects of Native American tribal sovereignty that 
had been lost in the Allotment Era. Despite Collier’s efforts to get away 
from the guardian-ward relationship, Congress insisted upon continued 
oversight of the tribes, and planted the seeds for the second full-scale 
assault on tribal sovereignty with the passage of the Kansas Act of 1940. 
Through the Kansas Act of 1940, Kansas was granted almost complete 
criminal jurisdiction within tribal territory, to be followed by grants to more 
states.
273
 With seventy-five years worth of hindsight, the Indian New Deal 
looks less like a fully formed “era” of federal-Indian relations, and more 
like the efforts of one man (successful as they may have been) to slow a 
longer process of de-recognition that began with the Dawes Act in 1887 and 
culminated with termination policies in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. 
Yet policies enshrined in law during the Indian New Deal continue to 




The Termination Era from the mid-1940s until the mid-1960s was a 
second attempt at political de-recognition of tribal sovereignty. Despite the 
aims of the Indian New Deal, and perhaps in reaction to them, Congress 
passed a series of laws aimed at ending the special relationship between the 
federal government and the tribes, including the federal trusteeship of tribal 
lands, ending tribal self-government, and leaving Native Americans fully 
under the sovereignty of state governments.
275
 Termination included the 
granting of criminal or limited-criminal jurisdiction to some states to police 
Native American communities.
276
 Interestingly, though, Congress adopted 
                                                                                                                 
 272. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. at 987 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
5123). 
 273. See Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
3243); COHEN, supra note 140, § 6.04, at 580-81. 
 274. Historians, sociologists and other scholars continue to debate Collier’s legacy. For a 
discussion of his mixed legacy, see Elmer R. Rusco, John Collier: Architect of Sovereignty 
or Assimilation?, 15 AM. INDIAN Q. 49 (1991). See also Lawrence C. Kelly, The Indian 
Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality, 44 PAC. HIST. REV. 291 (1975). 
 275. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.06, at 84-93. 
 276. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1953 (Public Law 280), Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 & 28 U.S.C. § 1360). 
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termination policies on a tribe-by-tribe and state-by-state basis, instead of 
through wholesale termination legislation.
277
 For example, Congress passed 
Public Law 280 in 1953 which granted full criminal jurisdiction to five 
states over Indian Territory.
278
 The localized process suggests Congress’s 
wish to reserve for itself some powers to continue to recognize sovereignty 
for some tribes, while not for others. Some of the tribes targeted for 
termination, despite large populations and well-developed government 
structures, had abundant natural resources, calling into question 
congressional motives for termination policies.
279
  
8. The Present Period - Self-Determination 
One might be forgiven for a bit of whiplash in attempting to keep up 
with federal Indian policy in the mid-twentieth century. After the 
termination policies, which attempted to end self-government of the tribes, 
the political branches returned to policies of self-government and tribal 
sovereignty in the 1960s. Presidents Johnson and Nixon began the process 
of re-recognizing tribes that had been de-recognized in the Termination Era.  
Congress made further efforts to affirm the place of tribes in the American 
constitutional system with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (ICRA).
280
 Modern federal policies of self-determination are 
discussed more fully herein as part of the discussion of why the Court, if it 
is attempting to implement federal policy through implicit divestiture, is 
doing a poor job. 
Despite the federal government’s long oppression of Native Americans, 
which was enacted through policies of acculturation, removal, reservation, 
allotment and assimilation, federal policy has generally been, since the 
founding, to recognize tribal sovereignty, with the important exceptions of 
the Allotment and Termination Eras. Those latter policies have been 
repudiated since the 1960s. From the 1960s until the present, federal policy 
formulated by the political branches has continuously recognized Native 
American tribal sovereignty, which makes the current judicial hostility to 
Native American tribal sovereignty something of a curiosity. Why did the 
Court become hostile to notions of tribal sovereignty during a period of 
                                                                                                                 
 277. See COHEN, supra note 140, § 1.06, at 88, 91-92. 
 278. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588; see COHEN, supra note 140, § 6.04, at 537-78. 
 279. For the legislative background of termination policies, and the abandonment of the 
same, see Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 1181 (1983). 
 280. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012)). 
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foreign and domestic détente? Some of the potential justifications for 
implicit divestiture are addressed in the following sections.  
B. Implicit Divestiture Is Not Constitutional in Nature 
Perhaps, one might argue, that given the sui generis status of Indian 
tribes, the Court was not exercising a power of recognition in Oliphant and 
Montana, but was only doing its job by regulating the boundaries of 
federalism—highlighting the jurisdictional lines that states, tribes, and the 
federal government should not cross. That is, perhaps the Court was 
pronouncing upon the constitutional status of tribes. This issue became the 
subject of constitutional dialogue between the Court and the political 








First, in Duro v. Reina, the Court held that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa 
Indian Community—a federally recognized tribe—lacked jurisdiction to try 
an Indian non-member in tribal court.
284
 Albert Duro, an Indian but not a 
member of the Pima-Maricopa Tribe, was alleged to have committed a 
murder on tribal land.
285
 He was arrested by federal authorities and charged 
with murder, but the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute and he was 
released to the custody of the Tribe.
286
 The Tribe, whose criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Members was limited to misdemeanors by the ICRA, 
charged Duro with the illegal discharge of a weapon.
287
 Duro challenged his 
arrest through the habeas procedure of the ICRA, and argued in federal 
court that the Tribe lacked jurisdiction for even the minor misdemeanor 
charge.
288
 The Supreme Court, following the reasoning in Oliphant, 
agreed.
289
 It found that the same issues present for non-Indians in tribal 
courts—a lack of voting ability and other “citizenship” rights enabling 
participation in tribal governance—were present for non-member Indians as 
well, leading to, in the Court’s words, “unfairness” to the defendant.
290
 As 
                                                                                                                 
 281. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 282. Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)); see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)). 
 283. 541 U.S. 193. 
 284. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685. 
 285. Id. at 679. 
 286. Id. at 680. 
 287. Id. at 681. 
 288. Id. at 682. 
 289. Id. at 685. 
 290. Id. at 688. 
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with Oliphant and Montana, the Court’s assertion of the power to de-
recognize an aspect of tribal sovereignty in Duro, is constitutionally 
suspect. 
Before continuing the Duro narrative, let’s step back and consider what 
happened. The three branches of the federal government tag-teamed to 
create a criminal jurisdiction vacuum within tribes. Duro allegedly killed a 
fourteen-year old boy on tribal lands.
291
 The federal prosecutor (executive 
branch) declined to prosecute Duro.
292
 Because Congress (legislative 
branch) had limited tribal criminal jurisdiction to misdemeanors, the Tribe 
could not bring felony charges.
293
 When the Tribe brought a minor 
misdemeanor charge, the Supreme Court (judicial branch) prohibited even 
this action.
294
 Duro walked, apparently free to commit more murders on 
tribal lands, courtesy of the quirks of federal Indian law. 
Congress felt that the Court had overstepped its bounds in Duro and 
reacted. Congress amended the ICRA to affirm tribal sovereignty to try a 
case just like that of Duro (the “Duro-Fix”).
295
 The one-sentence 
amendment to the ICRA stated that Native American powers of self-
government include “the inherent powers of Indian tribes, hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”
296
 The question remained, however, as to whether Congress, in 
enacting the Duro-Fix, was delegating to the tribes a federal power to 
prosecute, or rather recognizing and affirming not just jurisdiction, but 
aboriginal sovereignty. That is, was Congress merely allowing the tribes to 
exercise what was otherwise a federal power, or was it recognizing the 
tribes’ own sovereign rights?
297
 Congress’s language of recognition served 
as a clue. In either case, though, congressional action here was a re-
assertion of political branch control over the recognition power.  
The Court had the chance in United States v. Lara to interpret the Duro-
Fix, including its constitutionality. Billy Jo Lara, like Albert Duro, was an 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Id. at 679. 
 292. Id. at 680. 
 293. Id. at 681. 
 294. Id. at 685. 
 295. Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)). 
 296. Id.  
 297. Between the Duro-Fix and the Court’s opinion in Lara, scholars debated this 
question. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation That 
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(1993); L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising 
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 62 (1994).  
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Indian accused of a crime by a tribe other than his own, and challenged his 
federal arrest as a violation of double jeopardy after having been convicted 
in tribal court.
298
 In deciding his fate, the Court had to interpret not only the 
Duro-Fix, but also its own actions in Duro.
299
 The Court could have “struck 
down” the Duro-Fix as a violation of constitutional principles, in a manner 
reminiscent of City of Boerne v. Flores
300
 and Dickerson v. United States,
301
 
and freed Lara. That is, the Court could have held that once an aspect of 
tribal sovereignty was lost, even implicitly, then it was gone forever. And 
the only possible way Congress could “restore” an inherent power was 
through a delegation of federal power, which would trigger double 
jeopardy.
302
 This approach was advocated by Justices Souter and Scalia in 
dissent who wrote, “our previous understanding of the jurisdictional 
implications of dependent sovereignty were constitutional in nature.”
303
  
However, a majority of the Court felt differently and held that Congress, 
in recognizing criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, was in fact 
recognizing and affirming inherent tribal sovereign authority.
304
 In doing 
so, the Court necessarily characterized its own decision in Duro, and by 
extension Oliphant and other implicit divestiture cases, as something other 
than eternal constitutional law, although it is not clear what that is. The 
Court acknowledged to a degree that the recognition power belonged to the 
political branches and not to the Court.
305
 One might think that the Court, in 
the face of Congress’s “Duro-Fix,” would begin to “tread lightly” in future 
cases. One would be wrong. Congress’s Duro-Fix and Lara did not signal 
                                                                                                                 
 298. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196-97. 
 299. See id. at 196. 
 300. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was a 
legislative “fix” to the Court’s ruling in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990). In Flores, the Court ruled the RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to the states 
because, the Court asserted, Congress cannot alter the substance of Constitutional provisions 
(as interpreted by the Court), but can only seek to enforce them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 301. 530 U.S. 438 (2000). In Dickerson, the Court disallowed a congressional “fix” to the 
Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431. 
 302. Under this approach, the Court would not technically “strike down” the Duro-Fix, 
but would interpret it in a manner to render it consistent with its understanding of the 
Constitution, despite the clear language of the statute recognizing an “inherent” power, not a 
delegated one. Justice Thomas calls attention to the problems of delegations of executive 
power not only to non-executive branches of government, but also tribal governments. See 
Lara, 541 U.S. at 216-17 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 303. Id. at 228 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 304. Id. at 210. 
 305. Id. at 207. 
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the death of implicit divestiture. Rather, they seem to have embedded it 
more by reinforcing the idea that virtually all sovereignty is lost except that 
which is specifically affirmed. Congress, at the time it fixed Duro, could 
have also “fixed” Oliphant, but chose not to. Congressional silence on the 
issue may have emboldened the Court, who seems to have interpreted such 
silence as a green light to proceed with implicit divestiture. Thus, the Court 
continues to make assumptions about the loss of tribal sovereignty that 
intrude upon the recognition power.
306
 
The Supreme Court and Congress, then, both agree that implicit 
divestiture is not constitutional in nature. Unlike the Court’s federalism 
cases involving states, implicit divestiture is completely divorced from the 
text and structure of the Constitution. Rather, it is an exercise through 
which the Court itself attempts to structure the relationship between the 
United States and the tribes. 
C. Implicit Divestiture Is Not Appropriate Federal Common Law-Making 
Perhaps the most tenable defense of implicit divestiture jurisprudence is 
the argument that the Court is doing nothing more than creating federal 
common law, subject to congressional override. The Court’s decision in 
Lara, in which it acquiesced to the congressional override of Duro, 
supports such a view.
307
 Federal common law is not and should not be 
absent in federal Indian law. Indeed, the rule of explicit divestiture I 
propose in Part III of this Article might reasonably be characterized as a 
common law rule. However, federal Indian law common law rules must 
abide by the limits placed upon the judiciary to create common law in other 
contexts. Implicit divestiture is not appropriate federal common law. To 
argue that it is, necessitates an expansive view of the judiciary’s common 
law-making power that is belied by (1) the limited and circumspect nature 
of the federal common law power, (2) the vesting of the recognition power, 
and (3) the history of tribal recognition. 
                                                                                                                 
 306. Rulings under the implicit divestiture framework are not constitutional in nature, as 
the Court acknowledges, in the sense that they are not unassailable by the political branches 
(in the way that the Court’s rulings in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and 
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) are unassailable). This is not 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/2
No. 1] TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY & RECOGNITION POWER 123 
 
 
The Court’s Erie doctrine
308
 significantly reduced the power of federal 
courts to create common law.
309
 Still, there are some limited areas where 
the Court may formulate common law. “These instances are ‘few and 
restricted,’ and fall into essentially two categories: those in which the 
federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,’ 
and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law.”
310
 This latter category involves federal areas of 
substantive law, such as bankruptcy and admiralty, and allows the judiciary 
to fill in the gaps of statutory law.
311
 Because Congress has not given the 
judiciary explicit power to develop substantive federal Indian law, this 
latter category cannot be used to justify common Indian lawmaking.  
The other category of appropriate federal common law, described in 
Texas Instruments, is the protection of federal interests.
312
 Interestingly, 
although the Court in Lara characterized its implicit divestiture rulings as 
federal common law, it did not in that case or in any other case point to the 
federal interest at stake.
313
 In Oliphant, the Court seems to suggest that the 
federal interest at stake is to protect non-Indians from what the Court 
viewed as non-constitutional criminal procedures.
314
 That justification may 
have been plausible in the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries when 
tribes were still treated as akin to foreign sovereigns, but makes no sense in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as Native Americans are United 
States citizens. In Oliphant’s progeny, the Court makes little, if any, effort 
to point to a federal interest it sought to protect. 
Further, and more importantly, federal common law is only appropriate 
where the political branches do not already occupy the field (to borrow 
language from preemption doctrine) by statute or by constitutionally vested 
authority.
315
 If an area of law is addressed by statute or constitutionally 
committed to another branch of government, the Court should defer to that 
branch’s authority.
316
 The problem in federal Indian law is, as Alex 
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 309. Id. at 78-79. 
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 311. Id. at 641.  
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 313. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07 (2004). 
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 315. See generally Skibine, supra note 4. 
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Tallchief Skibine points out, the “Court seems to think that there are no 
constraints because it has given Congress plenary power over Indian 
nations . . . if Congress can potentially act without limits in Indian affairs, 
so can the Court.”
317
 Whether congressional plenary power can be justified 
or not, the powers of recognition and de-recognition are committed 
constitutionally to the political branches, not to the judiciary. If the 
Constitution had been silent on the power of recognition, then perhaps the 
Court’s implicit divestiture doctrine might have been defensible as federal 
common law. But the Constitution is not silent. Even when the political 
branches have not explicitly addressed a particular aspect of sovereign 
power, the courts are still not warranted in appropriating the prerogative of 
another branch to de-recognize that aspect of sovereignty, because the duty 
to so lies elsewhere. 
The history of Native American tribal recognition, which the Court must 
turn to as part of the implicit divestiture exercise, indicates that the political 
branches have recognized tribal sovereignty through the nation’s history, 
even if they have simultaneously acted to curtail it. The political branches 
have occupied the field—literally and figuratively. Although there is a 
place for common law in federal Indian law, adjusting sovereign powers is 
a matter to be worked out between the tribes and the political branches. 
What is a court to do then, when faced with the issue of whether a tribe 
may exercise a particular sovereign power that the political branches have 
not explicitly addressed even though they have the constitutional authority 
to do so? The Court must maintain the status quo, allowing the political 
branches to protect explicitly any federal interest that they deem harmed by 
the exercise of tribal sovereignty. The proposed rule of explicit divestiture 
is discussed more fully in Part III of this paper. 
D. Implicit Divestiture Does Not Implement Federal Policy 
Justice Thomas, while calling into question the constitutionality of the 
Act of 1871, indicates that the statute “nevertheless reflects the view of the 
political branches that the tribes had become a purely domestic matter.”
318
 
Even if that were true 145 years ago (and the historical record suggests 
otherwise), there is no reason that federal policy must remain fixed in the 
1870s. If the Court is attempting to implement federal policy through 
implicit divestiture, it is doing a poor job. Federal policy since the late 
                                                                                                                 
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 
(1997). 
 317. Skibine, supra note 4, at 97-98. 
 318. Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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1960s has consistently characterized the relationship of the United States to 
the tribes as “nation-to-nation,” even if it leaves some of the particulars 
unaddressed.  
Although the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 created a crude 
preliminary process of recognition and acknowledgement, the formal 
process used today by which the United States recognizes tribal sovereignty 
was put in place in 1978.
319
 The federal acknowledgement process is a 
creature of the BIA, relying on delegated authority from Congress to the 
executive to “prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into 
effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs.”
320
 
Through the promulgation of regulations, the BIA created an application 
process through which tribes can apply for federal recognition (and all the 
benefits that go along with recognition, including funding for housing, 
health and other services, and potential gaming operations).
321
 The BIA has 
set up criteria for recognition, which include elements of Indian “identity,” 
communal cohesion, governmental structure and governing documents.
322
 
The BIA’s federal acknowledgement process, like implicit divestiture, is 
not without its critics. Matthew L.M. Fletcher offers a sharp critique of the 
both the theory behind the federal acknowledgement process and the 
manner in which it has been implemented.
323
 Vine Deloria, Jr. has sharply 
criticized the apparent ability of low-level federal bureaucrats to negate 
previous acts of Congress respecting tribal recognition.
324
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STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 273 (2001). 
 320. 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
 321. See Myers, supra note 319, at 279-83. 
 322. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11 (2015). 
 323. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Politics, History and Semantics: The Federal Recognition 
of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487 (2006). See also the two books reviewed by Fletcher 
therein: RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF TRIBAL 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT (2005) and MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TRIBES: UNRECOGNIZED 
INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS (2004). 
 324. Fletcher, supra note 323, at 515-16; see also Gerald Carr, Origins and Development 
of the Mandatory Criteria Within the Federal Acknowledgement Process, 14 RUTGERS RACE 
& L. REV. 1, 4, 8 (2013). Carr calls attention to a curious statute, 25 U.S.C. § 5130 (formerly 
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In addition to the BIA process and congressional policies to encourage 
Indian self-determination, successive heads of the executive branch have 
consistently lauded tribal sovereignty since the 1970s. In a special message 
to Congress in 1970, President Nixon affirmed the national policy of 
recognizing and encouraging Native American self-determination.
325
 
President Carter signed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 
affirming the right of Native Americans to practice religious ceremonies 
otherwise prohibited by law.
326
 On January 24, 1983, Ronald Reagan issued 
a presidential proclamation regarding the relationship of the United States 
to Native American tribes and nations. There, he expressed his 
administration’s intent to “restore tribal governments to their rightful place 
among the governments of this nation and to enable tribal governments, 
along with state and local governments, to resume control over their own 
affairs.”
327
 In furtherance of that goal, President Reagan moved the White 
House Liaison Office for Native Tribes to the Office of Intergovernmental 
Affairs to underscore its “commitment to recognizing tribal governments on 
a government-to-government basis.”
328
 Presidents George H.W. Bush, 
Clinton, and George W. Bush have issued similar statements.
329
 President 
Obama, during the course of announcing the United States’ support for the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, told 
Native American leaders that he wanted to improve the “nation-to-nation” 
                                                                                                                 
 325. See President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 8, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573. 
Although many scholars regard Nixon’s legacy in Indian affairs favorably, Carole Goldberg 
has recently offered a sharp critique based upon his Supreme Court appointments, including 
those who helped create implicit divestiture. See Carole Goldberg, President Nixon’s Indian 
Law Legacy: A Counterstory, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1506 (2016).  
 326. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012)). 
 327. Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan on American Indian Policy 5 (Jan. 24, 
1983), http://www.tribalconsultation.arizona.edu/docs/Executive%20Branch/idc-002004. pdf.  
 328. Id. at 2. 
 329. For George H.W. Bush’s characterization of the federal Indian relationship as 
“government-to-government,” see President George Bush, Proclamation 6230—National 
American Indian Heritage Month, 1990, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 14, 1990), 
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characterization, see President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13084—Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 14, 1998), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55959&st=clinton&st1=native+american. 
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Bush, Executive Order: American Indian and Alaska Native Education, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 
30, 2004), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/ 20040430-
10.html.  
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relationship between the United States and the tribes.
330
 The political 
branches have occupied the field of sovereign recognition. The Court 
should respect that.  To the extent the Court must guess at federal policy 
regarding any particular sovereign power because the political branches 
have not been clear,
331
 it ought to give primary importance to the statements 
of the political branches affirming tribal sovereignty and nationhood, rather 
than assuming the political branches consider sovereign powers to be lost.  
Further, the Court itself has at least once conceded that implicit 
divestiture is not an attempt to implement federal policy. In Oliphant, the 
Court stated, “Even ignoring . . . congressional policy, Indians do not have 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such 
power by Congress.”
332
 That is, faced with an inability to ascertain federal 
policy, the Court’s approach was to assume a divestiture of a sovereign 
power, rather than maintaining the status quo until such time as the political 
branches explicitly announce a policy. In doing so, the Court created its 
own policy. 
E. Justice Thomas’s Concerns 
As indicated in the introduction, the Court’s implicit divestiture doctrine 
has many critics. One prominent critic of the Court’s modern Indian law 
jurisprudence in general is Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas has 
characterized federal Indian policy as it relates to tribal sovereignty as 
“schizophrenic” and suggests the confusion has likewise created tensions in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the same.
333
 Justice Thomas has 
staked out a curious position in tribal sovereignty cases. Beginning with 
Lara, Justice Thomas has repeatedly called for a complete overhaul of the 
Court’s approach to resolve the tensions between plenary power and 
inherent sovereignty, even while concurring with the majority in most 
Indian law opinions.
334
 It is not clear how much support Justice Thomas has 
attracted. His many concurrences, which read like dissents, have not been 
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Obama Tells Tribes, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
128 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
joined by other Court members. However, Justice Thomas’s dissenting 
opinion in Michigan v. Bay Hills Indian Community, in which he argued for 
a limited conception of tribal sovereign immunity, garnered three additional 
votes.
335
 And certainly at least four members of the Court, presumably 
including Thomas, were skeptical of tribal sovereignty in the recent Dollar 
General split decision.
336
 Justice Thomas’s concerns deserve consideration 
here in light of their relation to the recognition power and implicit 
divestiture. 
Justice Thomas has critiqued federal Indian law jurisprudence as recently 
as the 2015 term. His concurring opinion in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle 
suggests he remains suspicious of the notion that the tribes retain any 
aboriginal sovereignty.
337
 However, his most extensive commentary of 
federal Indian law is found in his Lara concurrence to which he has 
repeatedly cited. In Lara, Justice Thomas calls attention to a tension created 
in the Court’s jurisprudence by two competing notions: (1) that Congress 
has plenary power to legislate on behalf of the tribes; and (2) that the tribes 
retain inherent and aboriginal sovereignty.
338
 If Congress truly has plenary 
power to abrogate tribal sovereign powers, he argues, then tribal 
sovereignty itself is nullified, especially as it is characterized in Wheeler—
as a source of power distinct and separate from Congress.
339
 Justice Thomas 
is suspicious, however, of congressional plenary power in Indian affairs, 
which is consistent with his wider jurisprudence, through which he seeks to 
root congressional power in explicit textual commitments.
340
 
Justice Thomas is also suspicious of tribal sovereignty itself, at least for 
tribes who have not had their sovereignty specifically re-affirmed through 
treaty. In this, Justice Thomas’s approach is similar to implicit divestiture. 
                                                                                                                 
 335. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045-55 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Indeed, one may say it is implicit divestiture on steroids, a kind of judicial 
termination policy where the Court would not only hold that some tribes are 
divested of particular sovereign powers, but that they are divested of 
sovereignty itself. If one follows Justice Thomas’s approach to its logical 
conclusion, as he asks us to do, one would find many tribes judicially 
terminated and tribal members living only as citizens of the United States 
and the several states. Justice Thomas’s approach, presumably, is to state 
that Congress had no authority to pass the Major Crimes Act,
341
 for 
example, but also that tribal sovereignty in many cases has been completely 
annihilated through the Act of 1871. What’s left? Native American 
individuals who are the citizens of the state in which they reside, as well as 
citizens of the United States. The states would exercise, then, full criminal 
and regulatory authority over Native Americans, with no governmental role 
left for tribes. Justice Thomas’s approach, if adopted, would force the 
United States to return to a treaty-making process with the tribes if it 
wished to affirm tribal sovereignty and negotiate with the tribes on a nation-
to-nation basis. 
Justice Thomas offers a thoughtful critique of federal Indian 
jurisprudence and he is right to call attention to the questionable sources of 
congressional plenary power—a doctrine which runs counter to the idea of 
a national government founded upon limited and enumerated legislative 
powers. However, his approach to tribal sovereignty suffers from the same 
constitutional defect as implicit divestiture—that is, he assumes the 
judiciary can exercise a power of de-recognition. Even if Justice Thomas 
were to find no constitutional home or status for the tribes, as a member of 
the Court he must still defer to the executive branch in the exercise of the 
recognition power. The significance he would ascribe to the Statute of 1871 
is misplaced for reasons set forth herein. The Act of 1871 was not a 
sovereignty Rubicon and treaty making is not the “one mechanism” for 
sovereign nations to interact with each other, as he asserts.
342
 Not only in 
tribal affairs, but also in foreign affairs, sovereign or quasi-sovereign 
entities may be recognized even in the absence of treaties, as is the case 
with Taiwan. 
Justice Thomas’s approach demonstrates the perils of a binary 
federalism. He falls into the same trap as the Court did in Kagama, in the 
belief that there are but two sovereigns within our federal system. Should 
the Court follow Justice Thomas’s reasoning in some sort of judicial 
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termination of tribal sovereignty, it will make the same mistake the Court in 
Kagama did—reading into the Act of 1871 congressional intent to 
extinguish tribal sovereignty where such intent is not there. Even the Act 
under direct consideration in Kagama—the Major Crimes Act—does not 
purport to extinguish tribal sovereignty, although it intrudes upon it by 
establishing concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases. There is no need to 
interpret the Statute of 1871 as the defining moment of Native American 
sovereignty. To the extent the political branches did, during the height of 
the United States’ imperial period, disparage tribal sovereignty near the 
point of extinction, as it also did during the Termination Era, there is no 
reason they could not retreat and re-establish it through the recognition 
power. Even if the Act of 1871 had embedded a de-recognition policy, it 
has been overridden by subsequent recognitions of native sovereignty, by 
both political branches.  
IV. Replacing Implicit Divestiture with Explicit 
(and Constitutional) Divestiture 
A. A Rule of Explicit Divestiture 
When the Supreme Court has confronted the sovereign status of foreign 
entities, it has remained “hands off” and deferential to the political 
branches. When confronted with the sovereign status of Indian tribes and 
nations, the Court has chosen to involve itself much more aggressively in 
the substance of the issues. The Court’s greater involvement is 
understandable to a point, in that Indian tribes and nations are closely 
intertwined with the United States historically, geographically and 
constitutionally in ways that foreign sovereigns are not. It is not 
unreasonable for the Court to do in federal Indian law what it often does in 
other areas of constitutional law—referee jurisdictional disputes between 
competing government institutions. Nevertheless, the prerogative power to 
recognize (and de-recognize) sovereign entities, whether foreign or 
domestic, remains with the political branches in the least, if not solely with 
the executive. The very same reasons that lead the Court to avoid ruling on 
the sovereign status of foreign entities (the need for unity and clarity) also 
demand that the Court not muddy the waters in Indian policy. 
The Court’s foray into judicial de-recognition has led to unpredictable 
and sometimes contradictory results. Whereas Oliphant, Montana, and 
Strate all purport to have found a historical basis sufficient for determining 
that various aspects of sovereignty have been divested because they are 
“inconsistent” with the status of the tribe, Wheeler and Santa Clara suggest 
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that tribes retain inherent aboriginal sovereignty. The Court has de-
recognized a large enough number of sovereign powers that aboriginal 
sovereignty has been judicially reduced to not much more than a theory that 
expresses itself in double jeopardy cases. As for predicting what the 
Supreme Court or any other federal court will do when faced with a 
contested exercise of tribal sovereignty, it is anyone’s guess. Recently, the 
Fifth Circuit has offered a more liberal interpretation of the Montana 
exceptions,
343
 but the Supreme Court remains divided. Wheeler and Santa 
Clara also state that tribal sovereignty is subject to complete legislative 
defeasance by the United States, in a way that state sovereignty is not.
344
 
Yet if sovereignty is to mean anything, it ought not to be extinguishable at 
the legislative whim of another sovereign. The Court does not currently 
have a workable system for deciding cases of tribal sovereignty. 
The Court should therefore adopt a rule of explicit divestiture. Under 
explicit divestiture, the Court would presume all sovereign powers are 
retained except those which have been explicitly and constitutionally 
surrendered. Explicit divestiture begins with the Court acknowledging, as it 
has many times before, that Indian tribes in North America were sovereign 
entities prior to the arrival of Europeans and that aboriginal sovereignty is 
perpetual, though subject to extinction or diminution through conquest. 
Under explicit divestiture, the Court would continue to acknowledge the 
losses of sovereign powers effectuated through treaty or appropriate statute. 
The Court would abandon the third prong of the Oliphant/Montana 
formulation—the idea that sovereign powers that are inconsistent with their 
status as domestic dependent nations have been lost. Using an explicit 
divestiture rule, the Court would adopt a default position that “All is 
retained except that which is specifically surrendered.” That is, in the 
absence of clear statements from the political branches indicating their 
intrusion into traditional aspects of sovereignty, the Court should assume 
such sovereignty remains. In the presence of such statements, the Court 
should restrict itself to its traditional constitutional duty of examining the 
source of power for federal action. 
In following a rule of explicit divestiture, the Court would not be 
breaking new ground. Rather, it would be returning to the pragmatic and 
constitutional approach used in Ex parte Crow Dog. There, the Court was 
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asked by the BIA to find that the federal government could exercise 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country for Indian-on-Indian crime.
345
 
Essentially, the BIA asked the Court to find that the tribes were implicitly 
divested of a sovereign power—exclusive criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Territory. Finding no clear and unambiguous language in the treaties, 
however, the Court declined, and the matter was subsequently placed before 
the political branches, who responded as the BIA hoped.
346
 The Court then 
reviewed the congressional response (the Major Crimes Act) to ascertain its 
constitutionality in Kagama.
347
 Even if one disagrees with the Court’s 
decision in Kagama, as many scholars do,
348
 the constitutional dialogic 
process set off by Crow Dog is a good pattern for the modern Court to 
follow.  
This approach would call into question a line of cases. For example, had 
the Court used an explicit divestiture approach in Oliphant, it would have 
followed the lead of Justice Thurgood Marshall and Chief Justice Burger, 
who would have limited the Court’s inquiry into whether the Suquamish 
had surrendered through treaty or statute the power to try non-Indian 
criminals.
349
 Similarly, the result in Montana might very well be different 
under an explicit divestiture approach given that most treaties establishing 
reservations do not expressly limit tribal regulatory authority. Other cases 
called into question include those discussed herein, such as Strate and 
Plains Commerce Bank.  
A rule of explicit divestiture would help resolve issues currently facing 
the Court or likely to face the Court. For example, in Dollar General, had 
the Court addressed the merits, and had the Court adopted an explicit 
divestiture rule, the Court would look only to see whether the national 
government, through treaty or statute, had explicitly divested the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians of civil jurisdiction over a tort claim 
by a member against a non-member for acts alleged to have occurred on 
tribal lands, either through treaty or statute. Addie Rolnick points us to 
several issues of criminal law for which tribal jurisdiction are still in 
question due to the Court’s current jurisprudence, including tribal 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over members and juvenile justice.
350
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A rule of explicit divestiture would also serve as a partial response to the 
concerns raised by Justice Thomas in Lara. Justice Thomas’s two concerns 
with modern federal Indian law jurisprudence are: (1) that he cannot find a 
constitutional basis for federal plenary power and (2) he has concerns that 
there is no strong basis for continued aboriginal sovereignty in the absence 
of treaty making.
351
 Justice Thomas appears willing to go further than 
implicit divestiture and assume all aboriginal sovereignty is lost, or at least 
that which has not been established through treaty.  
To his first concern, a rule of explicit divestiture does not assume the 
existence of federal plenary power, and would allow Justice Thomas and 
like-minded thinkers to continue to question it. As with any other piece of 
federal legislation, the Court may analyze acts of divestiture to ensure they 
are rooted in an enumerated power. Treaties, especially ones with Native 
American tribes, are likewise subject to some judicial scrutiny. 
To Justice Thomas’s second concern, however, explicit divestiture would 
flip the Court’s assumptions about tribal sovereignty. Under the Court’s 
current implicit divestiture jurisprudence, the Court scours the historical 
record to pick out evidence suggesting any particular sovereign power is 
preserved or lost. Using such an approach, it is no wonder that the Act of 
1871 stands out as central. Through explicit divestiture, though, where 
tribal sovereignty is presumed to continue in the absence of clear statements 
from the political branches, the Act of 1871 recedes in importance. 
B. What Role Is Left for the Court? 
Although the Court would show more deference to the political branches 
in structuring the relationship between the United States and the tribes 
under an explicit divestiture approach, the Court would not transform itself 
into a rubber-stamping branch. The Court would not adopt a “where 
Congress goes, we will follow” attitude, as it seemed to do in earlier cases 
like Kagama and Lone Wolf. Just as implicit divestiture runs afoul of the 
separation of powers, wholesale judicial acquiescence in unmoored federal 
power over the tribes would render the judiciary a meaningless branch in 
Indian law. Rather, under explicit divestiture, the judiciary could and 
should investigate the sources of congressional and executive power to 
legislate for or otherwise interact with tribes. The judiciary should maintain 
its ability to serve as a check on federal and state interactions with tribes. 
Further, in Indian law, there remains a constitutional question that is 
entirely appropriate for the Court to address. That question is “Do tribes 
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have constitutional status?” Judges, scholars and the tribes themselves are 
divided on the question. The tribes were not represented at the Convention 
in Philadelphia and tribes as such are not represented in Congress. The most 
concerted effort to create an “Indian” state—the State of Sequoyah—was 
rebuffed by Congress.
352
 And yet the Constitution acknowledges tribes in 
several places. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to 
preserve tribes as self-governing entities by carving out an exception to the 
Citizenship Clause.
353
 And the Tenth Amendment is, as its ultimate clause 
suggests, a nod to popular and not just state sovereignty.
354
 If Native 
Americans have truly become part of “We the People” through citizenship 
and constitution-making, then they ought to be able to take advantage of the 
federal structure offered by the United States constitutional system. If the 
Court truly believes in the principles it unanimously espoused in its “Ode to 
Federalism” in Bond v. United States,
355
 it should protect, not attack, tribal 
sovereignty. In any event, the question is worth considering. Even if the 
judiciary does not have the only or ultimate say on the constitutional 
question, it still has a say. Further, even if the Court were to find a 
constitutional “home” for tribes, such a finding would not render the 
recognition power a nullity with respect to tribes. The political branches 
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still have a role in structuring what remains an ambiguous relationship 
among the national government, the states, and the tribes.  
Under explicit divestiture, the Court would continue to play the same 
role it does in other federalism cases. The Supreme Court has no say in the 
creation of new states, for example. To create and “recognize” new states, 
Congress must pass enabling acts, signed by the President, and states must 
adopt state constitutions that comport with the enabling act and with the 
federal Constitution. Once admitted, however, states enter the Union on 
equal footing with other states. At that point, the Court steps in to fulfill its 
constitutional duty to determine whether state laws violate the Constitution 
and whether a congressional exercise of power unjustifiably interferes with 
a power reserved to the states. Similarly, the Court has no say in the 
recognition or de-recognition of tribes. However, once those tribes are 
recognized and become part of the constitutional order, the Court should, as 
it does with states, police jurisdictional boundaries.  
C. Other Proposals: Similarities and Differences 
Other scholars have proposed similar ways of getting away from implicit 
divestiture. Michalyn Steele suggests the use of the political question 
doctrine as a feasible way for the Court to remove itself from the 
contentious issues of tribal sovereignty.
356
 That is, the Court could 
acknowledge the lack of judiciable manageable standards for determining 
inherent sovereignty and whether certain sovereign powers are inconsistent 
with the tribes’ status, leaving such questions to the political branches. This 
approach would be far better than the current doctrine of implicit 
divestiture. For, under implicit divestiture, the Court has adopted a position 
of suspicion and hostility toward retained tribal sovereignty, whereas under 
the political question doctrine, the Court would at least be neutral on the 
issue and the tribes would be able to avail themselves of the political 
process. Indeed, Steele makes the case for a similar rule of explicit 
divestiture by arguing that “courts should presume that tribes have retained 
inherent authority unless Congress has specifically and explicitly divested 
the tribe of [that] particular [authority].”
357
 An added value of Steele’s 
approach is that it allows the Court some face-saving as it upends nearly 
four decades of jurisprudence. “[T]he Court can justifiably reverse course 
after examining the struggle of lower courts to find judicially manageable 
standards. . . . [I]t can undo precedent when presented with evidence of the 
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infirmity of its previously announced standards.”
358
 A rule of explicit 
divestiture as I propose herein would demand that the Court confess to and 
repent of its past doctrine. Such an abrupt course change is sometimes hard 
to effectuate. Steele’s political question approach would follow the pattern 
of other political question cases decided on a lack of judicially manageable 
standards, and permit the Court to exit the scene with more grace and 
dignity. 
Yet, as Steele acknowledges, adopting the political question doctrine in 
the area of tribal sovereignty would be controversial because it would 
seemingly put the tribes’ existence at the mercy of the political branches, 
with no apparent recourse to the courts. For this reason, Steele does not 
argue for a “wholesale embrace” of the political question doctrine in Indian 
affairs, but rather seeks to engage in a discussion of its potential 
applicability. Nevertheless, Steele states that under this approach, “tribal 
challenges to congressional diminutions of inherent tribal authority 
must . . . be treated as political questions.”
359
 Although this approach would 
be better than implicit divestiture, it opens the tribes up to termination 
without judicial recourse, contrary to their acknowledged status in 
Cherokee Nation and Worcester. The history of the Allotment and 
Termination Eras informs us that the political branches may turn hostile 
toward tribal sovereignty in short order, perhaps in the context of global 
conflict or, more likely, with the discovery of valuable resources on tribal 
lands.
360
 The political question doctrine approach would preclude the Court 
from investigating and enforcing the limits of congressional power in 
Indian affairs as well as investigating and opining upon the constitutional 
status of the tribes. 
While it is true that the Court should give greater deference to political 
branch determination regarding tribal sovereignty, this deference should be 
based upon an acknowledgement that the recognition power is vested in the 
political branches, and not in the judiciary. The advantage to an explicit 
divestiture approach over the political question doctrine is that the Court 
could still exercise its Article III powers to police jurisdictional boundaries 
among federal, state, and tribal authorities. Under a rule of explicit 
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divestiture, the Court could employ a judicial shield in the defense of tribal 
sovereignty; under the political question doctrine, it could not. 
Addie Rolnick advocates for an “inside out” approach to tribal 
sovereignty in the criminal context, by which questions of retained 
sovereign powers are centered upon and resolved by their relationship to 
tribal self-governance, rather than an “outside in” approach where tribal 
sovereign powers are considered merely to be gap-fillers in the maze of 
federal and state jurisdiction.
361
 While not specifically abandoning implicit 
divestiture, the “inside out” approach would certainly be more favorable to 
tribes and provide greater flexibility in the design and implementation of 
tribal criminal justice systems. She notes that various scholars have 
advocated this approach, and some lower courts already employ it, despite 
tensions with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
362
 Indeed, the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion in Dollar General may be characterized as moving in this 
direction. 
This “inside out” approach is a much better way to address tribal 
criminal jurisdiction within the Court’s current implicit divestiture 
framework by reframing the question of whether a sovereign power is 
inconsistent with a tribe’s status as whether the sovereign power is an 
element of a tribe’s sovereignty and whether it has to be taken away.
363
 If 
the implicit divestiture doctrine is to remain in place (and there appears to 
be only one member of the current Court even interested in a wholesale re-
evaluation of tribal sovereignty law), then Rolnick’s approach makes sense. 
It offers a way to render implicit divestiture more predictable and 
determinate, as well as friendly to tribal sovereignty, or at least not hostile 
to it. However, the use of an “inside out” approach does not avoid the 
constitutional issue raised herein, for it would leave power in the hands of 
the judiciary to de-recognize tribal sovereignty, even if the bar for de-
recognition is raised. It is also unclear whether the “inside out” approach 
could transfer easily to the civil arena, where the Court has been most 
active in recent years in divesting tribes of sovereignty. 
V. Conclusion 
When Anglo-American colonists sought to justify their separation from 
British rule, they turned to one of England’s own—John Locke, the 
formidable defender of the Glorious Revolution—to find articulation of 
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their cause. And while Locke’s two treatises on government played a 
central role in the unfolding drama, his Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education was likewise enlisted in the cause.
364
 There, Locke argued that 
parents have a responsibility to treat their children as rational beings by 
rearing them with patience and kindness, with the goal of preparing them 
for the responsibilities of adulthood.
365
 Locke emphasized that parents 
should train their children to use their own reason.
366
 American colonists 
argued that Brtish authorities did not treat the colonists as rational humans 
and did not allow the colonies to “mature” into self-governance.
367
 
Therefore, they said, the British were violating their responsibility as a just 
“parent,” and forcible separation was justified.
368
  
Two strains of American paternalism developed out of this revolutionary 
rhetoric. First, the “Lockean” kind by which newly acquired American 
territories were encouraged to “mature” into self-governing states. Indeed, 
the statehood process, as first set forth in the Northwest Ordinance, created 
new states on equal footing with the original ones throughout the long 
nineteenth century.
369
 The second strain of paternalism, though, disallowed 
for growth and maturity in the “ward.” Under this latter theory, the ward 
was considered permanently unable of full participation in civic life. This 
brand of paternalism was used to justify slavery as well as restrictions on 
women’s civil rights.  
Paternalism has permeated federal-Indian relations throughout United 
States history and continues to do so today, primarily through Supreme 
Court doctrine. The characterization of the Native Americans as “wards” 
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and the federal government—complete with a “Great White Father” at the 
head—as the “guardian” found a place in both law and policy.
 370
 And yet 
the historical record provides no clear answer to the question of which 
strain of paternalism the federal government in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries proposed to adopt with the tribes (regardless of their 
need to have a “guardian” in the first place). Implicit divestiture has 
calcified paternalism with respect to native tribes by suggesting that tribal 
governance in general and tribal courts in particular are not to be trusted in 
the administration of justice to tribal outsiders. 
We live in a historical moment where the political branches are relatively 
friendly toward the notion of tribal sovereignty, compared with past eras. 
The Tribal Law and Order Act amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to give 
tribes greater sentencing power for felonies, although it does not come close 
to allowing tribes to punish as they see fit.
371
 The 2013 Reauthorization of 
the Violence Against Women Act granted tribes the right to prosecute non-
Indians for certain cases of domestic violence, with the promise of even 
greater criminal jurisdiction to come.
372
 The Obama administration in 2010 
affirmed United States support for the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People.
373
 His predecessors in the Oval Office have 
dealt with tribes on a nation-to-nation basis. Of the three branches of 
government, the judiciary is the one currently suspicious of, if not 
completely hostile to, native sovereignty. 
The Court’s treatment of tribal sovereignty is not only needless, but 
violates the separation of powers. The Constitution spells out who has the 
power to interact with sovereign entities, including the power to recognize 
them and the power to de-recognize them and it is not the Court. The Court 
should more closely follow the Constitution’s vesting of the recognition 
power by abandoning implicit divestiture and replacing it with a rule of 
explicit divestiture. 
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Despite the political branches’ currently friendliness to tribes, the lessons 
of history are that federal policy toward tribal sovereignty can change, and 
change quickly. Not only was federal policy toward tribal policy hostile in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the 
twentieth, but after a period of friendly, even if paternalistic, policies during 
the “Indian New Deal” of the Franklin Roosevelt administration, the policy 
changed quickly with the onset of the Cold War. Global events or domestic 
energy crises might cause the federal government to alter course again, 
perhaps engaging in another period of termination. Under such 
circumstances, the political branches may suddenly become less friendly to 
notions of tribal sovereignty, and be tempted to exceed their constitutional 
powers to the detriment of tribes. Tribes should be able to appeal to the safe 
haven of the Constitution for protection from the political branches. For that 
reason, the Court should not remove itself completely from issues of 
sovereignty. Adopting a rule of explicit divestiture would not rob the Court 
of its ability and authority to engage in judicial responsibilities. If limits are 
to be found on federal plenary power, it is the Court that will need to find 
them. In the meantime, the Court should retreat from implicit divestiture 
and allow the recognition power to be exercised by the branches in which it 
is vested. 
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